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CHURCH-STATE COOPERATION DOES NOT VIOLATE A
GUARANTEE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A STUDY OF THE
1978 SPANISH CONSTITUTION AND 1979 CONCORDAT
WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
ABSTRACT
For much of Spanish history, to be a Spaniard and to be a Catholic were
understood as equivalent. Spain had seven different constitutions in a span of
150 years and the question of religion was one of the main issues in each new
constitution. From the early 1800s until the Constitution of 1978 Spain
oscillated between two extremes: on one side, complete identification of the
Church with the state; and on the other, state discouragement and restriction
of the Church. Neither extreme provided for religious freedom. The
Constitution of 1978 was different. It struck a workable balance in churchstate relations by embracing the historical and social importance of the
Catholic Church while at the same time protecting the rights of minority
religions.
One of the interesting ways the constitution protects the rights of minority
religions is by requiring the state to cooperate with religions. Recognizing that
church and state are not fundamentally opposed to one another, and that
religion is a positive social phenomenon, the constitution ensures that the
church and the state will work together to achieve their mutual goals. To date,
Spain has negotiated cooperation agreements with four religious
denominations: the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Federation, the Islamic
Federation, and the Jewish Federation. This Comment analyzes Spain’s
cooperation agreements and its recent religious liberty case law and argues
that this system of cooperation agreements provide real and effective religious
liberty.
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INTRODUCTION
For much of Spanish history, “[t]o be a Spaniard and to be a Catholic were
understood as equivalent; they were two sides of a single national identity.”1 In
1812, Spain’s first written constitution declared, “[T]he religion of the Spanish
nation is, and will forever be, the one true Roman, Catholic, and Apostolic
Church.”2 Two centuries later, Catholicism remains an important social and
political force in Spain. Pope Benedict XVI made three visits to Spain in a sixyear span3—more than any other country in that same time period.4 Spain also
remains a religiously homogenous society. In a 2010 study, seventy-three
percent of Spaniards (roughly 34.3 million) declared they were Catholic.5
Despite the historic ties between Spain and the Catholic Church, the
country is becoming more religiously diverse. Due to a recent influx of
immigrants, Spain is now home to approximately 1.4 million Protestants, 1.5
million Muslims, and hundreds of thousands of Buddhists, Hindus, Jews,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and Orthodox Christians.6 In total, non-

1 Javier Martínez-Torrón, Religious Freedom and Democratic Change in Spain, 2006 BYU L. REV. 777,
780; see also Zoila Combalía & María Roca, Religion and the Secular State of Spain, in RELIGION AND THE
SECULAR STATE : NATIONAL REPORTS 629, 630 (Javier Martínez-Torrón & W. Cole Durham, Jr. eds., 2010)
(noting that from the expulsion of Muslims and Jews in the fifteenth century until the recent increase in
immigration, Catholicism was de facto the only religion in Spain).
2 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA MONARQUÍA ESPAÑOLA art. 12, Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain) (translated from
Spanish) (“La religión de la Nacion [sic] Española es y será perpetuamente la Católica, apostólica, romana,
unica [sic] verdadera. La Nacion [sic] la protege por leyes sabias y justas, y prohive [sic] el exercicio [sic] de
qualquiera [sic] otra.”).
3 In 2007, the Pope traveled to Valencia for the World Meeting of the Family and, in 2010, he made a
pastoral visit to Santiago de Compostela and Barcelona. MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES Y DE
COOPERACIÓN, DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE COMUNICACIÓN EXTERIOR, ESTADO DE LA CIUDAD DEL VATICANO
(SANTA SEDE) 38 (2010). In 2011, the Pope visited Madrid for World Youth Day. FROM HIS HEART TO
YOURS: THE WORDS OF POPE BENEDICT XVI: WORLD YOUTH DAY MADRID (2011), available at http://
worldyouthday.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Pontifical-Messages-of-WYD-2011.pdf.
4 Benedict XVI: Apostolic Voyages Outside Italy, HOLY SEE, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
benedict_xvi/travels/index_outside-italy_en.htm (last visited May 9, 2013).
5 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2010: Spain,
U.S. DEP’T ST. (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148986.htm [hereinafter International
Religious Freedom Report 2010]. In a 2009 study by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, seventy-six
percent of the nearly 2500 Spaniards surveyed identified themselves as Catholic. CENTRO DE
INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOLÓGICAS, ESTUDIO NO. 2.811, at 18 (2009) (Pregunta 24).
6 Spain has no official government census to measure religion because its constitution provides that no
individual is required to answer questions about his or her religious beliefs. International Religious Freedom
Report 2010, supra note 5.
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Catholic religious groups claim about two percent of Spain’s population,7 and
non-believers and Atheists claim roughly twenty percent.8
The Spanish Constitution, which was enacted in 1978, protects the rights of
both the Catholic majority and the minority religions. It professes the
importance of freedom of religion and provides that no religion shall be
preferred by the state.9 However, the Constitution also requires all public
authorities to “take into account the beliefs of Spanish society” and to maintain
a cooperative relationship with the Catholic Church and the rest of Spain’s
religious denominations.10 Spain maintains a cooperative relationship with the
Catholic Church through four treaties with the Holy See that regulate the
economic, political, and social rights of the Catholic Church, and which
together constitute a concordat.11 These agreements call for a partnership of
church and state.12 This partnership is permissible because Spanish lawmakers
have not interpreted the Constitution’s requirement of state neutrality as a
means of disestablishment. The Spanish constitutional system understands that
state neutrality does not require a strict separation of church and state; the state
can cooperate with religious organizations and still achieve full religious
freedom for all.13
The coexistence of disestablishment on the one hand and church-state
cooperation on the other might seem to be a contradiction in terms to an
American audience. The American protection of religious freedom has two
elements: disestablishment and free exercise.14 Although much of American
7

CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCOLÓGICAS, supra note 5, at 18 (Pregunta 24).
Id.
9 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA art. 16, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“Los poderes públicos
tendrán en cuenta las creencias religiosas de la sociedad española y mantendrán las consiguientes relaciones de
cooperación con la Iglesia Católica y las demás confesiones.”).
10 Id. (translated from Spanish).
11 A concordat is “a treaty concluded between the papal see and the government of a Catholic nation, to
regulate . . . the relations between the Catholic church and the state.” Gaston de Bourge, Concordat,
CYCLOPÆDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 555, 555 (John J. Lalor ed., N.Y., Charles E. Merrill & Co. 1890). The Holy See negotiated concordats
with twenty-eight nations, mostly in Europe and Latin America, between 1107 and 2009. See Agreements of
the Holy See, HOLY SEE, www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/index_concordati-accordi_en.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2013). Because a concordat typically regulates the entire legal situation of the Catholic Church
in a country, the four separate agreements forged between the Holy See and Spain in 1979 are commonly read
together as one cohesive instrument. Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 794.
12 De Bourge, supra note 11, 555–56.
13 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 790.
14 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent with
Religious Freedom?, 49 MCGILL L.J. 635, 652 (2004).
8
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First Amendment jurisprudence has enforced a rigid separation of church and
state, the United States Supreme Court has recently indicated that this
separation is not always necessary.15 European models of church-state relations
show that a movement toward the establishment of one religion does not
necessarily infringe upon the religious freedom of another.16 In particular,
Spain’s experience shows that cooperation with religious denominations is a
good thing because it helps them use their religious freedom more effectively.
This Comment will show that the Spanish model of church-state relations
adequately protects freedom of religion and is consistent with European
standards. Part I will present background information on the history of churchstate relations in Spain from the early 1800s to the present. Part II will discuss
how the government applied constitutional principles of religious liberty in the
1979 Concordat. It will analyze specific provisions of the Concordat and argue
that they are permissible under the Spanish model of church-state relations. In
Part III, this Comment will analyze the Concordat of 1979 in light of European
religious liberty standards. Although the Concordat establishes state preference
for the Catholic Church, Part III will argue that a mild form of state preference
does not violate the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. Finally, this Comment will conclude that the
Spanish model of church-state relations adequately protects freedom of
religion. The 1979 Concordat with the Catholic Church does not infringe on
the rights of other religions and does not violate constitutional principles of
equality and neutrality toward religion. Additionally, in light of both Catholic
and secular philosophy, the Spanish government’s commitment to cooperating
with all religious organizations is a good model for the protection of religious
liberty.
I. BACKGROUND
Throughout its history, Spain has struggled to find a balance between civil
and canonical authority. Catholic monarchs, believing in the divine right of

15

The Supreme Court has abandoned much of its strict separatism and allows religious parties to engage
in public activities. John Witte, Jr. & Nina-Louisa Arold, Lift High the Cross?: Contrasting the New European
and American Cases on Religious Symbols on Government Property, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 5, 53–54
(2011).
16 Id. The European Court of Human Rights has recently allowed the state to reflect the traditional
religious views of its majority. Id. at 53.
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kings,17 sought unity between these two forces, with God’s king and God’s
church governing together.18 Unfortunately, this led to intolerance of the nonCatholic population.19 As democratic regimes developed in European countries
in the nineteenth century, Spanish liberals became increasingly unhappy with
the government’s conflation of church and state.20 They questioned the merit
of having a strong church-state identification and favored a regime where the
state maintained no relations with religious groups.21 The church condemned
the growing tide of democracy and its notions of separation of church and
state.22 Secular and religious forces became embroiled in a bitter power
struggle.23
It was against this backdrop that Spain tried to define the relationship
between the church and the state. As an attempt to provide freedom for
believers of all religions, Spain’s early constitutions fared no better than its
monarchs. This Part will discuss how the constitutions followed the whims of
the dominant political party and did not serve the entire Spanish people.24
From 1812 to 1963, political power alternated between regimes that favored an
established church and regimes that favored strict separation. Subpart A will
find that neither establishment nor strict separation provided adequate
protection of religious freedom. Subpart B will outline the church-state
relations model developed by the current Spanish Constitution in 1978,
including its provisions for religious freedom, religious equality, state
neutrality, and state cooperation.
17 The divine right of kings is embodied in the book of Psalms, which says “I have installed my king on
Zion, my holy hill.” Psalms 2:6.
18 St. Thomas Aquinas said all law derives from eternal law, which is created by God. 2 SAINT THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1003–08 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros.
ed., 1948) (c. 1265–1274 CE). Therefore, kings should follow the teachings of the church. St. Augustine said
of kings, “[T]hey rule not from a love of power, but from a sense of the duty they owe to others.” 2 SAINT
AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, bk. XIX, ch. 14, at 322–23 (Marcus Dods trans., 1948) (c. 413–426 CE).
19 The sacred texts were also legal texts, and those who were not Catholic were considered second-class
vassals. Evaldo Xavier Gomes, Church-State Relations from a Catholic Perspective: General Considerations
on Nicolas Sarkozy’s New Concept of Laïcité Positive, 48 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 201, 204 (2009). This brings
to mind the examples of the Inquisition from the twelfth to sixteenth centuries and the expulsion of Jews and
Muslims in 1492. See generally Daniel Basterra Montserrat, The Constitutional Development of Religious
Freedom in Spain: An Historical Analysis, 4 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 27 (1995).
20 For a discussion of the impact of French laïcism on Spanish church-state relations, see José Antonio
Souto Paz, Perspectives on Religious Freedom in Spain, 2001 BYU L. REV. 669.
21 Id.
22 See Pope Pius IX, Quanta Cura (Dec. 8, 1864), in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1740–1878, at 382–83
(Claudia Carlen Ihm ed., 1981).
23 See infra Section I.A.
24 Montserrat, supra note 19, at 33 (quoting D. BASTERRA, CONCIENCIA Y LIBERTAD 16–20 (1978)).
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A. Church-State Relations before the Constitution of 1978
From the early 1800s until the Constitution of 1978, Spanish public policy
oscillated between two extremes: complete identification of the church with
the state, and state discouragement and restriction of the church.25 Neither
extreme provided religious freedom.26 From 1812 to 1978, political power in
Spain changed hands seven times, and the Spanish people were subject to
seven different constitutions. The regimes differed in their approach to churchstate identification but they did not grant religious freedom.
Spain’s first written constitution, created in 1812, was issued “in the name
of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.”27 It proclaimed that Catholicism was the
only permissible religion and prohibited the practice of any other religion.28
That this document exhibited religious intolerance and conflated the church
and the state reflects the deep entrenchment of Catholicism in Spanish political
and social life at the time.29 Further evidence of the entrenchment can be found
in the concordats negotiated by the Spanish monarch and the Holy See.
Nineteenth-century concordats provided that public education had to conform
to Catholic doctrine, the state could not interfere in a bishop’s performance of
his religious duties, the state would provide an income to the clergy, and any
dispute between the state and the church would be settled with reference to the
Catholic Church’s canon law.30
Not everyone was happy with the deep entrenchment of the Church.
Secularist factions, growing in military and political strength, wanted to
disestablish the Catholic Church. A military revolt in 1820 gave rise to a
liberal government whose first actions were to spurn the constitution’s

25 See generally George R. Ryskamp, The Spanish Experience in Church-State Relations: A Comparative
Study of the Interrelationship Between Church-State Identification and Religious Liberty, 1980 BYU L. REV.
616.
26 Religious freedom is defined as the right to be free from societal and governmental coercion in
religious matters. Id. at 617.
27 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA MONARQUÍA ESPAÑOLA pmbl., Mar. 19, 1812 (Spain) (translated from
Spanish) (“En el nombre de Dios todopoderoso, Padre, Hijo, y Espíritu Santo, autor y supremo legislador de la
sociedad.”).
28 Id. art. 12 (“La religión de la Nación Española es y será perpetuamente la Católica, apostólica, romana,
unica [sic] verdadera. La Nacion [sic] la protege por leyes sabias y justas, y prohive [sic] el exercicio [sic] de
qualquiera [sic] otra.”).
29 Ryskamp, supra note 25, at 621. It is especially interesting to note the conflation of church and state in
a document that was intended to be a liberal declaration of the rights of the people, and was one of the first
liberal Constitutions in Europe. Id.
30 De Bourge, supra note 11, at 565.
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protection of the Church.31 The government expelled bishops, restricted
religious orders, and seized Church property.32 The liberal legislature drafted a
new constitution in 1837, but because it did not have the political capital to
disestablish the Church completely, the new constitution maintained
Catholicism as the state religion.33 Meanwhile, the authorities continued to
violently remove bishops and priests from office.34
When the conservatives regained power in 1844, they again redrafted the
constitution and required the state to maintain and uphold the Catholic
religion.35 The Penal Code of 1848 penalized public acts against the Church,
including imposing a minimum prison sentence of twelve years for public
worship of a non-Catholic religion.36 The Conservative rule stifled minorities
and incited a revolution.37 During the revolution of 1868, liberal forces
confiscated Church lands and expelled bishops and priests, all in the name of
religious freedom.38
The Constitution of 1869 marked the government’s first strides toward
religious freedom for all. It guaranteed public and private observance of any
religion, even though the state would continue to maintain and uphold the
Catholic Church.39 This constitution struck a compromise by recognizing the
state’s obligation to support the Catholic Church without outlawing all other
religions. When the conservatives retook power in 1876, they drafted yet
another new constitution. But unlike conservative constitutions past, the
Constitution of 1876 continued the strides toward religious freedom, providing
that no person could be persecuted for his or her religious opinions.40

31

Ryskamp, supra note 25, at 621–22.
Id.
33 CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA MONARQUÍA ESPAÑOLA DE 1837 art. 11, June 18, 1837 (Spain) (“La Nación se
obliga a mantener el culto y los ministros de la religión católica que profesan los españoles.”).
34 Ryskamp, supra note 25, at 622.
35 Id. at 623.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 623–25.
38 Id. at 625.
39 CONSTITUCIÓN DEMOCRÁTICA DE LA NACIÓN ESPAÑOLA art. 21, June 6, 1869 (Spain) (“La Nación se
obliga a mantener el culto y los ministros de la religión católica. El ejercicio público o privado de cualquier
otro culto queda garantido a todos los extranjeros residentes en España, sin más limitaciones que las reglas
universales de la moral y del derecho. Si algunos españoles profesaren otra religión que la católica, es
aplicable a los mismos todo lo dispuesto en el párrafo anterior.”).
40 CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA MONARQUÍA ESPAÑOLA DE 1876 art. 11, June 30, 1876 (Spain) (“La religión
católica, apostólica, romana, es la del Estado. La Nación se obliga a mantener el culto y sus ministros. Nadie
será molestado en el territorio español por sus opiniones religiosas ni por el ejercicio de su respectivo culto,
32
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However, the 1876 Constitution did not provide complete protection of
religious freedom: It prohibited minority religions from worshiping publicly.41
The compromises struck by conservatives and liberals in the 1860s and
1870s did not provide lasting stability. Democracy deteriorated in the early
1900s, and, in 1923, Miguel Primo de Rivera declared himself dictator.42
Primo de Rivera criminalized public manifestation of a non-Catholic faith,
eliminating the government’s strides toward religious tolerance.43 In 1931,
Primo de Rivera’s government fell and a republic formed.44 The liberal
Constitution of 1931 stated “the Spanish state has no official religion.”45
Although the republic achieved disestablishment, it did not foster religious
liberty. The constitution required public acts of worship to be authorized by the
government (and did not elaborate criteria for denial, allowing for arbitrary
decisions); it prohibited religious institutions from engaging in activities with a
“political character,”—and in the heated social climate—political character
was a superficial requirement that allowed the state to easily close religious
institutions; it dissolved the Jesuit Order and severely restricted the other
religious orders; it prohibited religious orders from running schools; and it
prohibited priests and other religious from teaching the faith publically.46 In
practice, religious intolerance was even worse: the government fuelled public
expressions of hatred and violence against both the clergy and lay religious.47
Rather than building a democratic state based on individual freedom, the

salvo el respeto debido a la moral cristiana. No se permitirán, sin embargo, otras ceremonias ni
manifestaciones públicas que las de la religión del Estado.”).
41 Id.
42 Ryskamp, supra note 25, at 629.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 630.
45 C.E. art. 3, B.O.E., n. 344, Dec. 10, 1931 (Spain) (translated from Spanish) (“El Estado español no
tiene religión oficial.”). The Second Republic intended to use the changing political landscape to change the
course of religious politics by replacing the entrenched religiosity of the people with agnosticism or atheism.
Javier Martínez-Torrón, Derecho de Asociación y Confesiones en la Constitución de 1931, 3 CUESTIONES
CONSTITUCIONALES 91, 95 (2000) (Mex.).
46 C.E. art. 26, B.O.E., n. 344, Dec. 10, 1931 (Spain); see also Javier Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of
Religion in the Case Law of the Spanish Constitutional Court, 2001 BYU L. REV. 711, 716 n.8 [hereinafter
Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Religion]; Combalía & Roca, supra note 1, at 630; Martínez-Torrón, supra note
45, at 115.
47 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 45, at 95. For example, local and national authorities did nothing when
churches and other religious buildings were burned. Id. at 102. For an in-depth look at religious persecution
during the Second Republic, see VICENTE CÁRCEL ORTÍ, LA PERSECUCIÓN RELIGIOSA EN ESPAÑA DURANTE
LA SEGUNDA REPÚBLICA, 1931–1939, 109 (Sebastián Elcano ed., 2d ed. 1990).
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Second Republic actually severed one of the most important freedoms:
freedom of religion.48
Complete separation of church and state proved too liberal for the mostly
Catholic nation.49 A 1936 coup and ensuing three-year civil war led to the
thirty-six-year dictatorship of General Francisco Franco, who again declared
that Spain was a Catholic state and tasked all branches of the government with
protecting the church.50 The Concordat between Spain and the Vatican in 1953
gave the head of state the power to select three candidates for bishop, out of
which the Pope would make the final selection, and reincorporated the longexisting exemption of church hierarchy from criminal prosecution.51 Early in
his dictatorship Franco closed Protestant churches and required all children to
study Catholicism in school.52 He later moderated his policies, allowing
Protestants to reopen their churches, but still forbidding Protestants to operate
religious schools and engage in other forms of evangelization.53

48 Javier Martínez-Torrón, Transición Democrática y Libertad Religiosa en España, 53 PERSONA Y
DERECHO 183, 189 (2005) (Spain).
49 Ryskamp, supra note 25, at 630. The Church called the constitution “an attack on the Catholic
conscience of the nation, a challenge, an invitation to war.” Souto Paz, supra note 20, at 684 (quoting 28
EXTRACTO OFICIAL SESIONES CORTES CONSTITUENTES [OFFICIAL EXTRACT OF PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS] 21
(Aug. 27, 1931) (Spain)) (translation in Souto Paz). Even José Ortega y Gasset, one of Spain’s leading
intellectuals and a proponent of separating church and state, thought the Constitution of 1931 went too far. Id.
(quoting 33 OFFICIAL EXTRACT OF PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS 24 (Sept. 4, 1931) (Spain)).
50 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 782–83. The way the Second Republic dealt with the Church was a
big part of its downfall—it “created enemies where none existed” by creating sympathy for the fallen
monarchy. Martínez-Torrón, supra note 45, at 102 (translated from Spanish). This resulted in a return to a
confessional state. Martínez-Torrón, supra note 48, at 190.
51 Concordat Between the Holy See and Spain, Spain-Vatican, Aug. 27, 1953, 1219 U.N.T.S. 50 (“Los
Prelados . . . no podrán ser emplazados ante un juez laico sin que haya obtenido previamente la necesaria
licencia de la Santa Sede. . . . La Santa Sede consiste en que las causas criminales contra los clérigos o
religiosos por los demás delitos . . . sean juzgadas por los Tribunales del Estado. Sin embargo, la Autoridad
judicial, antes de proceder, deberá solicitar, sin perjuicio de las medidas precautorias del caso, y con la debida
reserva, el consentimiento del Ordinario del lugar en que se instruye el proceso.”); Convenio entre la Santa
Sede y el Gobierno Español acerca del modo de ejercicio del privilegio de presentación [Agreement Relating
to the Mode of Exercise of the Privilege of Presentation], Spain-Vatican, June 7, 1941, 1222 U.N.T.S. 364.
52 A Brief Historical and Legal Description of Religious Liberty, RUTHERFORD INST., http://
religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/rihand/Spain.html (last visited March 4, 2013).
53 Id. This moderation was driven by the Church itself. In 1965, the Second Vatican Council declared
that religious freedom was a personal right that states should recognize. Augustín Motilla, Religious Pluralism
in Spain: Striking the Balance Between Religious Freedom and Constitutional Rights, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV.
575, 578. In response, Franco enacted the Law of Religious Freedom in 1967. Id.; see also Ley de Libertad
Religiosa cap. 1, art. 1 (B.O.E. 1967, 44) (Spain) (“El Estado Español reconoce el derecho de libertad religiosa
fundado en la dignidad de la persona humana y asegura a esa, con la protección necesaria, la inmunidad de
toda coacción en el ejercicio legítimo de tal derecho.”).
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When Franco’s death brought the end of the dictatorship, the emerging
democracy was tasked with striking a workable balance in church-state
relations. A new constitution needed to be strong enough to effectively protect
religious liberty but not so rigid as to incite a coup. It needed to embrace the
enormous historical and social importance of the Catholic Church but also
respect the rights of minority religions. Additionally, because Spain had a
history of politicians disregarding its constitution, the country needed a
mechanism to enforce the rule of law. The drafters of the new constitution
created a parliamentary monarchy in Spain,54 with the King as the head of
state,55 an elected Prime Minister as the head of government,56 and a
democratically elected bicameral parliament as the legislature.57 The drafters
also created a Constitutional Court that is the only body that can comment on
the constitutionality of a law.58

54

C.E. art. 1.3, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
Id. art. 56 (“El Rey es el Jefe del Estado, símbolo de su unidad y permanencia, arbitra y modera el
funcionamiento regular de las instituciones, asume la más alta representación del Estado español en las
relaciones internacionales . . . .”).
56 Id. art. 96.
57 Id. art. 66. The Parliament is divided into two chambers, the Congress (Congreso de los Diputados),
and the Senate (Senado). Id.
58 Id. arts. 159–65; Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional art. 1 (B.O.E. 1979, 2) (Spain) (amended in
2010 as B.O.E. 2010, 1); see also S.T.C., Feb. 13, 1981, No. 189, in B.O.E. n. 47 (supp.), Feb. 24, 1981, p. 16,
FJ 6, at 19 (Spain) (“El Tribunal Constitucional es intérprete supremo de la Constitución, no legislador, y sólo
cabe solicitar de él el pronunciamiento sobre adecuación o inadecuación de los preceptos a la Constitución.”).
Decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on all public authorities. Ley Orgánica del Tribunal
Constitucional art. 38 (B.O.E. 1979, 2). When the Court declares a law or act unconstitutional, the law is
immediately null and void. Id. art. 39. When the Court declares that a law or act is constitutional, this has
preclusive effect on subsequent litigation. Id. art. 38.
The Constitutional Court has personal jurisdiction over the entire Spanish territory. It has subject
matter jurisdiction in three ways. First, the Constitutional Court has subject matter jurisdiction over questions
of the constitutionality of a law, including the constitution of each Autonomous Community, provincial and
national statutes, organic laws, executive orders, international treaties, and rulings of the lower courts. Id. art.
27. Second, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over violations of the fundamental liberties granted in the
constitution. Id. art. 41. The fundamental liberties include: article 14, all Spaniards are equal under the law, to
be free from discrimination on the basis of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion, or other personal or social
condition; article 15, the right to life, bodily integrity, freedom from torture, inhuman treatment, and the death
penalty; article 16, freedom of religion; article 17, due process of law; article 18, freedom from search and
seizure without a warranty; article 19, rights of free entry and exit for citizens; article 20, freedom of
expression; articles 21 and 22, freedom of peaceful assembly; article 23, the right to participate in public life,
directly or through a representative; article 24, access to the ordinary court; article 25, no ex post facto laws;
article 26, no honor courts; article 27, right to free elementary education; article 28, the right to form labor
unions and to strike; article 29, the right to petition the government. Id.; see also C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29,
1978 (Spain). Third, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over conflicts between the State and the
Autonomous Communities. Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional art. 59 (B.O.E. 1979, 2).
55
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B. Constitution of 1978
After the death of Franco in 1975, the Spanish government began a
transition to democracy. The nation elected a provisional parliament tasked
with writing a new constitution.59 One of the most hotly-contested tasks of the
provisional parliament was to negotiate a new model of church-state
relations.60 The first draft, which unequivocally stated, “The Spanish state is
not confessional,”61 was immediately denounced by Spain’s most influential
bishops.62
The second draft guaranteed freedom of religion and worship to all
individuals as long as it would not disturb the public order, and, although it
reiterated that the state would not be confessional, it required public authorities
to maintain cooperative relationships with all religious groups.63 By charging
civic authorities to take into account the beliefs of Spanish society, the draft
constitution shifted the secular state from a policy of indifference to one of
cooperation.64 This is important because it shows that the parliament
recognized that freedom of religion cannot be limited to freedom of
conscience, but must include freedom to worship publically.65 However
A case may come to the Constitutional Court through three channels. First is an “appeal of
unconstitutionality,” which alleges facial unconstitutionality of acts and statutes. Ley Orgánica del Tribunal
Constitucional arts. 29, 31 (B.O.E. 1979, 2); C.E. art. 162, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (translated
from Spanish). An appeal of unconstitutionality may be initiated by the President, the Ombudsman, a coalition
of fifty Congressmen, a coalition of fifty Senators, or the executive branch of an Autonomous Community. Id.
Second is a “question of unconstitutionality,” which allows a lower court to seek an advisory opinion from the
Constitutional Court about a statute implicated in a case before the lower court. Ley Orgánica del Tribunal
Constitucional arts. 29, 35 (B.O.E. 1979, 2) (translated from Spanish). Third is a petition for protection against
violations of fundamental rights and liberties, which may be brought against the state by a person with
standing. C.E. art. 162, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
To determine whether a challenged law or action conforms to the Constitution, the Court may consider
the text of the Constitution and prior judicial interpretation of the Constitution. Ley Orgánica del Tribunal
Constitucional art. 28 (B.O.E. 1979, 2). For more information about the Constitutional Court, see Enrique
Guillén López, Judicial Review in Spain: The Constitutional Court, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 529 (2008).
59 James M. Markham, Spain’s Constitution To Put Democracy on Firmer Footing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
1978, at A2.
60 James M. Markham, Dispute Erupts in Spain over Move To Separate Church and State, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1977, at A11.
61 Minuta de los Acuerdos de la Ponencia de Constitucion en su Sesion del Dia 30 de Agosto de 1977, 2
REVISTA DE LAS CORTES GENERALES, 257, 259 (1984) (Spain).
62 Markham, supra note 60. Religious leaders demanded the state protect the rights of Catholics in all
areas of social and political life. See Souto Paz, supra note 20, at 695.
63 Minuta de la Ponencia de Constitucion del Dia 6 de Septiembre de 1977, 2 REVISTA DE LAS CORTES
GENERALES, 262, 265 (1984) (Spain).
64 Souto Paz, supra note 20, at 692.
65 See id.
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socialist factions opposed this cooperation of church and state, and Church
officials argued that it didn’t go far enough to protect the religiosity of the
Spanish people.66
Revisions to the second draft constitution proposed a number of changes:
from “the state will not profess a preference for any religion;”67 to “no one will
be obliged to declare their religious beliefs”;68 to “no one will be obliged to
declare their ideological opinions;”69 to “the state will maintain a cooperative
relationship with the Catholic Church in recognition of the service it provides
the majority-Catholic society.”70 Each proposal had one thing in common:
They all aimed to put an end to the confessional state without leading to the
religious hostility characteristic of the preceding two centuries.
On December 29, 1978, Spain enacted its current constitution.71 The
Constitution’s purpose, as described in the preamble, was to guarantee
democracy and “protect all Spaniards in the exercise of human rights, culture,
traditions, languages, and institutions.”72 In accordance with emerging
international norms of human rights,73 Article 10.2 states that the fundamental
rights recognized by the Constitution shall be construed in conformity with the
66 “El Estado Laico no Daría Respuesta Suficiente a la Realidad Religiosa Española,” EL PAÍS, Nov. 27,
1977, at 9 (Spain).
67 COMISIÓN DE ASUNTOS CONSTITUCIONALES Y LIBERTADES PÚBLICAS, CORTES GENERALES,
ANTEPROYECTO DE CONSTITUCION: ENMIENDAS 278 (1978) (proposed by Don Laureano López Rodó of the
Alianza Popular).
68 Id. at 367 (translated from Spanish) (proposed by the Unión de Centro Democrático).
69 Id. at 297 (translated from Spanish) (proposed Don Ramón Tamames Gómez of the Communist Party).
70 Id. at 62 (translated from Spanish) (proposed by Don Federico Silva Muñoz of the Alianza Popular).
71 The constitution was approved by parliament on October 31, 1978, ratified by the Spanish people in a
referendum passed on December 6, 1978, and sanctioned by the King on December 27, 1978. It became
effective upon its publication in the official gazette, the Boletín Oficial del Estado, on December 29, 1978.
C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
72 Id. pmbl. (translated from Spanish) (“Garantizar la convivencia democrática” and “proteger a todos los
españoles y pueblos de España en el ejercicio de los derechos humanos, sus culturas y tradiciones, lenguas e
instituciones.”).
73 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which entered into force in 1948, provided the
foundation for religious freedom as a human right. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10,
1948). It was followed by a series of international instruments that established the framework for state
protection of religious freedom, including: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“ECHR”), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, which was opened for signature in 1950 and entered
into force in 1953; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), Dec. 16, 1966, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, which entered into force in 1966; and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, which was opened for signature in
1966 and which entered into force in 1976. For a good discussion of the international documents that protect
religious freedom, see John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green, Religious Freedom, Democracy, and
International Human Rights, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 583 (2009).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties ratified
by Spain.74 Article 81 of the Constitution establishes that fundamental rights
will be implemented through Organic Acts.75 The most important organic act
concerning freedom of religion was the Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa
(“LOLR”), passed on July 5, 1980.76 Together the Constitution and the LOLR
extend rights of religious freedom to all citizens.
A citizen’s free exercise of religion may be limited under the Spanish
Constitution “if necessary to maintain public order as protected by law.”77
Article 3.1 of the LOLR further limits the exercise of religion if it infringes on
the fundamental rights of others or if it compromises national security, public
health, or public morality, as protected by the rule of law in a democratic
society.78 Although the constitution does not explicitly include limitations for
public order, morals, health, and security, the Constitutional Court has held
that limitations not explicitly mentioned by the Constitution must be allowed if
they are implicit in the Constitution’s definition.79 The Court has held that the
limitations outlined in organic laws, such as the LOLR, are implicit in the

74 C.E. art. 10.2, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“Las normas relativas a los derechos
fundamentales y a las libertades que la Constitución reconoce se interpretarán de conformidad con la
Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y los tratados y acuerdos internacionales sobre las mismas
materias ratificadas por España.”). By 1978 Spain had ratified the ICCPR. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Status, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated May 6, 2013).
75 C.E. art. 81.1, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“Son leyes orgánicas las relativas al desarrollo de
los derechos fundamentales y de las libertades públicas, las que aprueben los Estatutos de Autonomía y el
régimen electoral general y las demás previstas en la Constitución.”).
76 Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (Spain); see also María J. Villa Robledo,
Reflexiones en Torno al Concepto de “Notorio Arraigo” en el art. 7 de la Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa,
1 ANUARIO DE DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 143 (1985) (Spain).
77 C.E. art. 16.1, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (translated from Spanish) (“Se garantiza la libertad
ideológica, religiosa y de culto de los individuos y las comunidades sin más limitación en sus manifestaciones,
que la necesaria para el mantenimiento del orden público protegido por la ley.”).
78 Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 3.1 (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (“El ejercicio de los derechos
dimanantes de la libertad religiosa y de culto tiene como único limite la protección del derecho de los demás al
ejercicio de sus libertades públicas y derechos fundamentales, así como la salvaguardia de la seguridad, de la
salud y de la moralidad pública, elementos constitutivos del orden público protegido por la Ley en el ámbito de
una sociedad democrática.”); see also S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001, No. 46, in B.O.E. n. 65 (supp.), Mar. 16, 2001, p.
83, FJ 11, at 90 (Spain) (“Tiene como único límite la protección del derecho de los demás al ejercicio de sus
libertades públicas y derechos fundamentales, así como la salvaguarda de la seguridad, de la salud y de la
moralidad pública . . . .”).
79 José M. González del Valle, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion
or Belief in Spain, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1033, 1045 (2005); see also S.T.C., Mar. 11, 1996, No. 34, in
B.O.E. n. 93 (supp.), Apr. 17, 1996, p. 3, FJ 4, at 7) (Spain) (“El ejercicio de este derecho no tiene otros límites
que los fijados explícita o implícitamente en la Constitución . . . .”).

CURVINO GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

7/16/2013 10:34 AM

CHURCH-STATE COOPERATION

523

Constitution’s definition.80 Therefore the LOLR’s limitations on freedom of
religion are carved out of the Constitution’s protective grant.
These limitations on freedom of religion are compatible with international
norms. For example, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) limits public expression of
religious beliefs when “prescribed by law and . . . necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”81
Two important definitions are inherent in the ECHR limitation. First, the fact
that the limitations must be “prescribed by law” indicates that they must
comport with due process.82 Second, the fact that the protection of public
order, health, morals, or security must be “necessary in a democratic society”
is important because it limits the limitation.83 Laws created for the protection
of public order and public morals might look very different in a democracy
than in a dictatorship.84 The ECHR was careful to ensure that a law prohibiting
the practice of a minority religion could not be justified as upholding the
public’s Catholic morals, for instance.
In addition to providing a generic grant of freedom of religion, the Spanish
Constitution follows the example of the ICCPR and ECHR and creates specific
provisions to guide the state in providing real and effective freedom. The
Spanish Constitution outlines four such provisions: (1) provisions protecting
religious freedom; (2) provisions providing for equality of all religions in the
eyes of the law; (3) provisions mandating state neutrality on questions of
religion; and (4) provisions requiring cooperation between the state and
religions. The first provision, protecting religious freedom, is the ultimate goal
of the Constitution’s protections and it provides a framework for interpreting
and applying the other three provisions.85 For example, when the state
80 González del Valle, supra note 79, at 1046; see S.T.C., Feb. 13, 1981, No. 189, in B.O.E. n. 47 (supp.),
Feb. 24, 1981, p. 16, FJ 22, at 22 (Spain) (“En materia de derechos fundamentales la Constitución no se ha
limitado a reservar su desarrollo normativo a Leyes orgánicas, sino que ha dispuesto además que todos los
españoles tienen los mismos derechos y obligaciones en cualquier parte del territorio del Estado . . . .”).
81 ECHR, supra note 73, art. 9; see also Javier Martínez-Torrón, Limitations on Religious Freedom in the
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 587 (2005).
82 González del Valle, supra note 79, at 1038–39 (quoting Carolyn Evans, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 138 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83 Id. at 1036.
84 Id. at 1038.
85 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 48, at 193; see also J. Ferrer Ortiz, Los Principios Constitucionales del
Derecho Eclesiástico como Sistema, in LAS RELACIONES ENTRE LA IGLESIA Y EL ESTADO: ESTUDIOS EN
MEMORIA DEL PROFESOR PEDRO LOMBARDÍA 309 (Eduardo Molano et al. eds., 1989).
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cooperates with the Catholic Church it must be careful not to undermine the
freedom of other religions. In this way, each provision adds a layer of
protection to the fundamental goal of religious freedom.
1. Religious Freedom
First, the Spanish Constitution protects individuals’ and groups’ right to
worship in whatever manner they choose. The religious freedom provision is
akin to what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls “freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion.”86 It is the right to private and public
manifestations of religious belief. The Spanish Constitution provides for
freedom of conscience in Article 16.1 and Article 9.2. This Subpart will
discuss Article 16.1 first because it contains the Constitution’s primary method
of protecting freedom of conscience. The other freedom of religion protections
define and cement the protections of Article 16.1.
a. Article 16.1
Article 16.1 protects freedom of conscience by stating: “Freedom of
ideology, religion, and worship of individuals and communities is guaranteed,
with no other restriction on their expression than may be necessary to maintain
public order as protected by law.”87 Article 1.2 of the LOLR expands on this
protection, stating that “religious beliefs are not reason for inequality or
discrimination under the law, and cannot be used prevent anyone from work,
activity or public service.”88 Specifically, the LOLR protects the right to: (1)
profess religious beliefs or choose to profess no belief;89 (2) commemorate
religious festivals, marital rites, and burial without discrimination, and not be
obliged to worship in a way contrary to personal convictions;90 (3) receive and

86

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 73, art. 18.
C.E. art. 16.1, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 39, 1978 (Spain) (translated from Spanish) (“Se garantiza la libertad
ideológica, religiosa y de culto de los individuos y las comunidades sin más limitación, en sus manifestaciones,
que la necesaria para el mantenimiento del orden público protegido por la ley.”).
88 Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 1.2 (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (Spain) (translated from Spanish) (“Las
creencias religiosas no constituirán motivo de desigualdad o discriminación ante la ley. No podrán alegarse
motivos religiosos para impedir a nadie el ejercicio de cualquier trabajo o actividad o el desempeño de cargos
o funciones públicos.”).
89 Id. art. 2.1(a) (“Profesar las creencias religiosas que libremente elija o no profesar ninguna; cambiar de
confesión o abandonar la que tenía; manifestar libremente sus propias creencias religiosas o la ausencia de las
mismas, o abstenerse de declarar sobre ellas.”).
90 Id. art 2.1(b) (“Practicar los actos de culto y recibir asistencia religiosa de su propia confesión;
conmemorar sus festividades; celebrar sus ritos matrimoniales; recibir sepultura digna, sin discriminación por
87
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pass on religious teachings and information and to choose for yourself and
your children moral and religious education;91 and (4) gather publically to
profess religion.92 All four of these rights must be protected from coercion.93
The rights outlined in the LOLR are broad and therefore open to
interpretation by the Constitutional Court. For example, the right to pass on
religious teachings to children does not address how to resolve a dispute
between parents who hold different religious views. In S.T.C. 141/2000, the
Court held that both parents may teach religion to their children as long as they
do not attempt to force the children to become believers.94 In that case, the
father converted to Gnostic Christianity and wanted to sell all his assets and
move the family to live in community with other Gnostics.95 The mother, who
disagreed with the tenets of this fringe religion, obtained a divorce and
attempted to prevent the father from seeing his children.96 She argued that his
lifestyle was aimed at forcing the children to accept Gnostic Christianity.97 The
lower court agreed with the mother and restricted the father’s visitation
rights.98 On appeal the Constitutional Court found no evidence of proselytism
and held that because the father did not intend to influence his children’s
religious beliefs, the restriction on his visitation rights was an impermissible
restriction on religious liberty.99 The Court affirmed that Article 16.1 of the
Constitution protects against state action that impedes or sanctions a person’s
beliefs,100 but clarified that the state may constrain external manifestations of

motivos religiosos, y no ser obligado a practicar actos de culto o a recibir asistencia religiosa contraria a sus
convicciones personales.”).
91 Id. art. 2.1(c) (“Recibir e impartir enseñaza e información religiosa de toda índole, ya sea oralmente,
por escrito o por cualquier otro procedimiento; elegir para sí, y para los menores no emancipados e
incapacitados, bajo su dependencia, dentro y fuera del ámbito escolar, la educación religiosa y moral que esté
de acuerdo con sus propias convicciones.”).
92 Id. art. 2.1(d) (“Reunirse o manifestarse públicamente con fines religiosos y asociarse para desarrollar
comunitariamente sus actividades religiosas de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico general y lo
establecido en la presente Ley Orgánica.”).
93 Id. art. 2.1 (“La libertad religiosa y de culto garantizada por la Constitución comprende, con la
consiguiente inmunidad de coacción . . . .”).
94 S.T.C., May 29, 2000, No. 141, in B.O.E. n. 156 (supp.), June 30, 2000, p. 40 (Spain).
95 Id. A 2(a), at 40.
96 Id.
97 Id. A 2(b), at 40.
98 Id. (“[L]a relación de los niños con [su padre] tendría un potencial efecto negativo en su desarrollo, por
lo que se estima debería evitarse dicho contacto excluyéndolo, explícitamente, en la regulación del régimen de
visitas.”); Id. FJ 1, at 43 (“[L]a Audiencia Provincial ha presumido de su pertenencia a dicho movimiento la
existencia de graves riesgos para el desarollo personal de sus hijos . . . .”).
99 Id. FJ 3, at 43–44.
100 Id. FJ 2, at 43.

CURVINO GALLEYSPROOFS2

526

7/16/2013 10:34 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

religious belief to protect the rights of others.101 Thus, if the father was forcing
his children to adopt Gnostic Christianity, the state could prohibit this coercion
to protect the rights of the children.
The Court has found a difference between personal exercise of religion102
and public exercise of religion.103 When Article 16.1 is invoked for the
protection of personal conduct, freedom of religion may be limited only to the
extent it infringes on other constitutional rights.104 But when Article 16.1 is
invoked for the protection of public conduct, for example, religious
propaganda, then the public conduct may be regulated if it infringes on the
rights of others, or compromises national security, public health, or public
morality.105
b. Article 9.2
Article 9.2 of the Spanish Constitution protects freedom of conscience by
requiring the state to actively ensure that Spaniards can freely practice their
religion. Article 9.2 states: “It is the responsibility of public authorities to
promote conditions for a real and effective liberty and equality of individuals
and of groups formed by them; they shall remove obstacles that impede their
operations and shall facilitate the participation of all citizens in the political,
economic, cultural, and social life.”106 The LOLR explains the need for state
101

Id. FJ 4, at 44 (“[E]l derecho a manifestar sus creencias frente a terceros mediante su profesión
pública, y el proselitismo de las mismas, suma a los primeros los límites indispensables para mantener el orden
público protegido por la Ley. Los poderes públicos conculcarán dicha libertad . . . .”).
102 Personal exercise is defined as conduct that does not impact a third party. Id.
103 Luis Castillo Córdova, La Internacionalización de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Constitución
Española 11 ANUARIO DA FACULTADE DE DEREITO DA UNIVERSIDADE DA CORUÑA 131, 147 (2007), available
at http://ruc.udc.es/dspace/bitstream/2183/2486/1/AD-11-10.pdf.
104 S.T.C., May 29, 2000, No. 141, in B.O.E. n. 156 (supp.), June 30, 2000, p. 40, FJ 4, at 44 (“[P]ara el
amparo de la propia conducta, sin incidencia directa sobre el ajena, la libertad de creencias dispensa una
protección plena que únicamente vendrá delimitada por la coexistencia de dicha libertad con otros derechos
fundamentales y bienes jurídicos constitucionalmente protegidos.”).
105 Id. (“[E]l derecho a manifestar sus creencias frente a terceros mediante su profesión pública, y el
proselitismo de las mismas, suma a los primeros los límites indispensables para mantener el orden público
protegido por la Ley.”); see also Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 3.1 (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (Spain) (“El
ejercicio de los derechos dimanantes de la libertad religiosa y de culto tiene como único límite la protección
del derecho de los demás al ejercicio de sus libertades públicas y derechos fundamentales, así como la
salvaguardia de la seguridad, de la salud y de la moralidad pública, elementos constitutivos del orden público
protegido por la Ley en el ámbito de una sociedad democrática.”).
106 C.E. art. 9.2, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“Corresponde a los poderes públicos promover las
condiciones para que la libertad y la igualdad del individuo y de los grupos en que se integra sean reales y
efectivas; remover los obstáculos que impidan o dificulten su plenitud y facilitar la participación de todos los
ciudadanos en la vida política, económica, cultural y social.”).
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action to protect freedom of religion, saying: “For the real and effective
application of religious rights, the state must adopt the means necessary to
facilitate religious assistance for persons under its care, such as people in the
military, in hospitals, and prisons, as well as provide for religious formation in
public schools.”107
The requirement that the state take action to promote religious freedom, in
addition to passively enforcing it, is important because it shows that the state
accepts religion as a normal element of public life.108 The manifestation of
religious belief, in any form, is appreciated as a positive social phenomenon.109
The church and the state are not opposed to each other; both serve the people,
so there must be dialogue and cooperation between them.110 By requiring the
state to cooperate with religious organizations, the Constitution ensures that
Spaniards actually have the ability to worship as they wish.
Both Articles 16.1 and 9.2 provide for freedom of conscience. They
provide a high degree of freedom for the religious and non-religious alike. The
protections apply to the actions of individuals and to religious communities in
private and in public, and are therefore compatible with international
standards.111
2. Religious Equality
Second, the Constitution requires equality of all citizens. Article 14 states:
“Spaniards are equal before the law and may not be discriminated against
because of their . . . religion . . . .”112 The Constitutional Court has interpreted
this provision to mean that different religions cannot receive different
treatment under the law,113 unless there is a reasonable and objective
justification.114
107 Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 2.3 (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (“Para la aplicación real y efectiva de
estos derechos, los poderes públicos adoptarán las medidas necesarias para facilitar la asistencia religiosa en
los establecimientos públicos militares, hospitalarios, asistenciales, penitenciarios y otros bajo su dependencia,
así como la formación religiosa en centros docentes públicos.”).
108 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 791.
109 Id. at 790–91.
110 Gomes, supra note 19, at 210–11.
111 Compare ECHR, supra note 73, art. 9, and ICCPR, supra note 73, art. 18, with ICESCR, supra note
73.
112 C.E. art. 14, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (translated from Spanish) (“Los españoles son
iguales ante la ley, sin que pueda prevalecer discriminación alguna por razón de . . . religión . . . .”).
113 S.T.C., May 29, 2000, No. 141, in B.O.E. n. 156 (supp.), June 30, 2000, p. 40, FJ 4, at 44 (Spain)
(citing S.T.C., Jan. 26, 1981, No. 65, in B.O.E. n. 47 (supp.), p. 1, FJ 5, at 3) (Spain)) (“[La libertad de
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One example of a reasonable and objective justification for discrimination
on the basis of religion is that the discrimination is necessary in a democratic
society.115 Although this justification is analogous to Article 9 of the ECHR,
which limits freedom of religion when necessary in a democratic society to
ensure public safety, health, and morality,116 it is broad and subject to abuse.
The European Court of Human Rights interprets the term “necessary” as a
pressing social need.117 The Spanish Constitutional Court has indicated that it
will follow this stringent interpretation.118
The Spanish Constitutional Court overturned a denial of religious freedom
in STC 46/2001, finding that the discrimination was not necessary in a
democratic society.119 When the state denied inscription in the national
Register of Religious Entities to the Church of Unification, the Church of
Unification brought a constitutional challenge.120 The state argued that a group
must have certain religious characteristics to be registered as a religious entity,
including belief in the existence of a supreme being, doctrinal truths, moral
standards, and ritual actions for individual or collective worship.121 Further, the
Church of Unification had been condemned by the European Parliament as a
dangerous cult.122 Although there were no reported illegal activities of the
Church of Unification in Spain, the lower court upheld the state action, stating
that discrimination against the Church of Unification was necessary to preserve
order in a democratic society.123 However, because registration involves the
state’s recognition of a religion as a juridical person, identifies a group of

conciencia y religión] tiene una particular manifestación en el derecho a no ser discriminado por razón de
credo o religión, de modo que las diferentes creencias no pueden sustentar diferencias de trato jurídico.”).
114 See, e.g., S.T.C., Nov. 16, 1993, No. 340, in B.O.E. n. 295 (supp.), Dec. 10, 1993, p. 81) (Spain);
Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 786.
115 González del Valle, supra note 79, at 1049 n.46.
116 ECHR, supra note 73, art. 9.
117 See, e.g., X v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 7992/77, 14 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 234 (1978)
(holding that a law requiring all motorcycle drivers to wear helmets was justified even though it infringed on
the rights of Sikhs).
118 See S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001, No. 46, in B.O.E. n. 65 (supp.), Mar. 16, 2001, p. 83, FJ 11, at 90 (Spain)
(“[N]o puede considerarse contraria a la Constitución la excepcional utilización preventiva de la citada
cláusula de orden público, siempre que se oriente directamente a la salvaguardia de la seguridad, de la salud y
de la moralidad públicas propias de una sociedad democrática, que queden debidamente acreditados los
elementos de riesgo y que, además, la medida adoptada sea proporcionada y adecuada a los fines
perseguidos.”).
119 Id.
120 Id. For a discussion of the Register of Religious Entities, see infra Part I.B.4.
121 S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001, No. 46, in B.O.E. n. 65 (supp.), Mar. 16, 2001, p. 83, A 2(b), at 83–84 (Spain).
122 Id. A 2(c), at 84.
123 Id.
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individuals who intend to worship publically without coercion, and facilitates
state cooperation, the Constitutional Court held that registration is an important
part of the Constitution’s grant of freedom of religion.124 Therefore,
registration may only be refused when the group fails to report its name,
address, representatives, and religious purposes.125 The state may not use other
criteria to refuse registration to a religious group.126 The state’s refusal to
register the Church of Unification infringed on the right to religious liberty.127
The principle of religious equality applies to state treatment of religion.128
Individuals may treat other individuals differently due to their religion as long
as they do not infringe on freedom of conscience and worship in violation of
Article 16.1.129 For example, in STC 19/1985 a convert to Seventh Day
Adventism was fired when she refused to work on Saturday, the day of her
Sabbath.130 The petitioner challenged her firing, the employment contract that
required her to work on Saturday but permitted rest on Sundays, and the state
labor law which established Sunday as a day of rest.131
First, the employment contract and firing of the petitioner were not state
actions.132 This means that they were constitutionally permissible as long as
they did not violate Article 16.1’s protection of freedom of conscience and
worship. The petitioner argued that when the employer required her to work on
Saturdays it infringed on her freedom of worship because she was unable to
124

Id. FJ 7, at 88 (“[E]l Registro de Entidades Religiosas . . . se inserta en un ordenamiento en el que
cobran especial vigor los derechos y libertades públicas, y de modo singular, la libertad más íntima y personal,
como la libertad religiosa y de culto, cuya garantía proclama el art. 16.1 de la Constitución.”). For example,
the Spanish Criminal Code gives special protection to registered religions: the code criminalizes violence,
intimidation, or force used to prevent the profession of any religious belief, but makes it an aggravated offense
to impede, interrupt, or disturb the ceremonies of registered religious groups. Id. Similarly, the Civil Code
gives special preference to registered religions: the code allows religious marriages (as opposed to secular
marriages) only in the manner provided by a registered religion. Id.
125 Id. FJ 8, at 88–89.
126 Id.
127 Id. FJ 9, at 89.
128 See, e.g., S.T.C., Feb. 13, 1985, No. 98, in B.O.E. n. 55 (supp.), Mar. 5, 1985, p. 25, at 26 (Spain)
(stating that the Constitution’s grant of freedom of religion cannot be used to impose changes on a contractual
relationship between a private company and its employee).
129 See S.T.C., May 29, 2000, No. 141, in B.O.E. n. 156 (supp.), June 30, 2000, p. 40, FJ 4, at 44 (Spain);
see also supra Part I.B.1.
130 S.T.C., Feb. 13, 1985, No. 98, in B.O.E. n. 55 (supp.), Mar. 5, 1985, p. 25 (Spain). The petitioner
began working for the company in 1971 and converted to Seventh Day Adventism in 1981. Id. A 1(c), at 25.
She requested a shift change or absence without pay to allow her to attend Saturday religious services, but the
company refused to accommodate her. Id.
131 Id. A 1, at 25.
132 Id. at 26.
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attend religious services.133 The Court disagreed, stating that although the
contract did not allow the petitioner to fulfill her religious duties, it was not a
coercive impediment to religious practice.134 At first blush this holding seems
incongruous—an employment contract that does not allow an employee to
attend religious services appears to be coercive. The Court explained that
although the contract produced a bad result for the petitioner, it was not
coercive because it treated every worker the same: everyone was allowed to
rest on Sunday.135 Requiring the employer to grant an exception for the
petitioner in this case would mean the employer would have to grant an
exception to all workers who wish to attend religious services during normal
working hours.136
Second, the Court examined the constitutionality of the state labor law,
which established Sunday as a day of rest. The labor law in question provides
that all workers must receive at least one day off per week, and that day will be
Sunday unless the employee and employer negotiate otherwise.137 It permits,
but does not require, the employer to negotiate a different day of rest for
minority religions.138 Examining the evolution of the Sunday rest, the Court
found that it stemmed from the Christian Bible’s creation of Sunday as a day
for rest and worship.139 However, the Court went on to say that because the
Sunday rest has been incorporated in labor laws since 1904, it had surpassed its
religious roots and become a secular tradition.140 The Court held that secular
tradition was a reasonable and objective justification for the Sunday rest, and
therefore the labor law was a permissible limitation on the petitioner’s freedom
of religion.141
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion by requiring that all
religions be treated equally under the law. This grant of equality is limited to
133

Id. A 1(c), at 25; see also id. at 26–27.
Id. at 26–27.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 26 (“[L]o que ésta pretende no es la anulación total o parcial del contrato, sino que se le dispense
del cumplimiento de las obligaciones que libremente aceptó y que considera ajustadas a derecho. . . .”).
137 Id. at 27.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. (“Que el descanso semanal corresponda en España, como en los pueblos de civilización cristiana, al
domingo, obedece a que tal día es el que por mandato religioso y por tradición se ha acogido en estos pueblos;
esto no puede llevar a la creencia de que se trata del mantenimiento de una institución con origen causal único
religioso, pues . . . si comprende el ‘domingo’ como regla general de descanso semanal es porque este día de la
semana es el consagrado por la tradición.”).
141 González del Valle, supra note 79, at 1049 n.46.
134
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state action, and may be further constrained when the state can prove a
reasonable and objective justification. In this way, Spain provides adequate
protection for all religions.
3. State Neutrality
The Constitution’s third protection of religious freedom is a provision
guaranteeing state neutrality. Article 16.3 abolishes the confessional state,
saying “no religion shall have state character.”142 This disestablishment means
that the state cannot make religious pronouncements; it does not mean that the
Spanish state will profess atheism or agnosticism. A state profession of
atheism, for example, would also be contrary to state neutrality because it
would give state character to a negative declaration of faith.143 The Spanish
Constitution does not promote a secular order that opposes religion in public
life.144 Competing religions can engage in public discourse as long as the state
does not make value judgments or exhibit a preference for any one religion.145
When the state takes any action involving religion or religious rights, that
action will be closely scrutinized to ensure that it was motivated by the social
effects of the religious activity, not the religious characteristics.146 The Spanish
concept of neutrality does not require civil authorities to be indifferent toward
religion, but does require that they work to provide a neutral framework
capable of accommodating a broad range of beliefs.
In S.T.C. 154/2002, for example, a thirteen year-old boy in need of a blood
transfusion refused the procedure because it was against the teachings of his
religion.147 Despite the hospital’s urging, the boy’s parents did not force him to
have the transfusion.148 When the boy fell into a coma, the hospital got a court
order and administered the transfusion.149 Unfortunately, the transfusion was
too late, the boy died, and the lower court found his parents guilty of

142 C.E. art. 16.3, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (translated from Spanish) (“Ninguna confesión
tendrá carácter estatal.”). This is echoed word-for word by the Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa (“LOLR”).
Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 1.3, (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (Spain).
143 Brett G. Scharffs, Four Views of the Citadel: The Consequential Distinction Between Secularity and
Secularism, 6 RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 109, 111 (2011). For a discussion of the difference between a state
policy of secularism and a state that avoids identification with any particular religion, see id.
144 Id. at 110–11; Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 786–88.
145 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 786–87.
146 Id. at 787.
147 S.T.C., July 18, 2002, No. 154, in B.O.E. n. 188 (supp.), Aug. 7, 2002, p. 51, A 2, at 51–53) (Spain).
148 Id. A 2(b), at 51–52.
149 Id. A 2(b), at 51–53.
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homicide.150 On appeal, the Constitutional Court held that the court-ordered
transfusion violated the boy’s right to freedom of conscience.151 The
Constitution’s protection of freedom of religion includes both freedom of
belief and freedom to act in accordance with those beliefs.152 The state cannot
infringe on the manifestation of religious beliefs when it does not like the
results.153
When the hospital ignored the boy’s wishes, it made a value judgment with
respect to his religious beliefs. When the lower court found the parents guilty
of homicide, it affirmed the hospital’s value judgment. In so doing, the state
violated the principle of neutrality, which requires that the state not comment
on the validity of any religion’s teachings.
The Constitution’s requirement of state neutrality protects minority
religions from unequal treatment at the hands of the state. But, rather than
requiring strict separation of church and state, Spain allows religions to engage
in public discourse.154 Religious groups may express their ideas in every
sphere of human activity, including public education.155 State officials may not
comment on the validity of any one religion, but may work with religions
when necessary in a democratic society. In this way, Spain recognizes the
strong social and historical importance of the Catholic Church while providing
strong freedoms for minority religions.
4. State Cooperation
The Constitution’s fourth protection of religious freedom is a requirement
that the state cooperate with religious organizations. Article 16.3 states: “The
state must take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish society and
maintain cooperative relations with the Catholic Church and the other

150

Id. A 2(b)–(c), at 53.
Id. FJ 2, at 56 (La acción del hospital “resulta evidente la violación de los derechos que al menor
Marcos garantizan [el] artículo[] 16.1.”).
152 Id. FJ 6, at 59 (“[L]a libertad religiosa tiene una doble dimensión, interna y externa . . . incluye
también una dimensión externa de agere licere que faculta a los ciudadanos para actuar con arreglo a sus
propias convicciones y mantenerlas frente a terceros.”).
153 Id. FJ 11, at 61 (“[L]os órganos judiciales no pueden configurar el contenido de los deberes de garante
hacienda abstracción de los derechos fundamentales . . . .”).
154 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 791.
155 See infra part II.C. See generally Javier Martínez-Torrón, School and Religion in Spain, 47 J. CHURCH
& ST. 133 (2005).
151
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religions.”156 Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Spanish Constitution does not
aim to separate politics and religion completely. Recognizing that the church
and the state are not fundamentally opposed to one another, and that religion is
a positive social phenomenon, Article 16.3 ensures they will work together to
achieve their mutual goals.157
Spain cooperates with religious organizations in two ways: through
registration in the public registry and through bilateral cooperation agreements.
a. Registration in the Registry of Religious Entities
Registration in the Registry of Religious Entities creates a broad juridical
framework for the State to work with religious groups. Article 5 of the LOLR
gives legal personality to any religion that is inscribed in the public registry of
religions.158 Any religion that can prove it has a legitimate group of followers
who adhere to a common set of religious beliefs will be recorded in the public
registry.159 In 2001, the Constitutional Court held that the authorities in charge
of the public registry must approve the application of all religious groups,
without discretion; only non-religious groups can be excluded from registration
(for instance, as the LOLR explicitly mentions, groups involved in the study of
paranormal activity).160 The Court further held that authorities in charge of the
registry cannot impose their own notion of religion as a prerequisite for
registration.161 The right to inscription in the public registry is part of the
156 C.E. art. 16.3, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (translated from Spanish) (“Los poderes públicos
tendrán en cuenta las creencias religiosas de la sociedad española y mantendrán las consiguientes relaciones de
cooperación con la Iglesia Católica y las demás confesiones.”). This is the Constitution’s only reference to the
Catholic Church, and it probably helped avoid negative backlash to the Constitution by Spain’s most
conservative circles. Martínez-Torrón, supra note 46, at 718 n.12 (citing JOSÉ JAVIER AMORÓS AZPILICUETA,
LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE 1978 (1984)).
157 Combalía & Roca, supra note 1, at 630.
158 Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 5.1 (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (Spain) (“Las Iglesias, Confesiones y
Comunidades religiosas y sus Federaciones gozarán de personalidad jurídica una vez inscritas en el
correspondiente Registro público, que se crea, a tal efecto, en el Ministerio de Justicia.”).
159 Id. art. 5.2 (“La inscripción se practicará en virtud de solicitud, acompañada de documento fehaciente
en el que consten su fundación o establecimiento en España, expresión de sus fines religiosos, denominación y
demás datos de identificación, régimen de funcionamiento y órganos representativos, con expresión de sus
facultades y de los requisitos para su válida designación.”).
160 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 46, at 743 (citing S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001, No. 46, in B.O.E. n. 65 (supp.),
Mar. 16, 2001, p. 83, FJ 8, at 88–89 (Spain)); see also Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 3.2 (B.O.E.,
1980, 7) (“Quedan fuera del ámbito de protección de la presente Ley las actividades, finalidades y Entidades
relacionadas con el estudio y experimentación de los fenómenos psíquicos o parapsicológicos o la difusión de
valores humanísticos o espiritualistas u otros fines análogos ajenos a los religiosos.”).
161 The definition of “religion” has been controversial. S.T.C 24/2001 held that inscription can only be
denied if a group will endanger individual rights and freedoms of others. Otherwise, the state must accept an
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constitutional right of religious freedom because it facilitates the collective
exercise of this right.162 The effect of this ruling is that every group claiming to
be religious will be accepted into the registry.163 Once recorded in the public
registry a religion will enjoy legal personality.164
According to the European Court of Human Rights, a State may
legitimately require religious organizations to register before instilling them
with legal personality.165 However, “the State must be careful to maintain a
position of strict neutrality and demonstrate it has proper grounds for refusing
recognition.”166 For example, in Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, the
state allowed the Church of Scientology to register as a religious entity in
1994, but in 1997, a new law changed the definition of religious entity and
required registered religions to prove their religious character and reregister.167 Among other things, the 1997 law required organizations seeking
registration to disclose the founder of the organization, information on the
basic tenets of creed and religious practices, documentation of the religion’s
existence in Russia for at least fifteen years, and the permanent address of the
organization.168 Registration could be refused if the aims and activities of the
religion contradict Russian law and if the organization does not have a
religious purpose.169 If a church was unable to register by the year 2000, the
court had the option to dissolve the association.170 When the Church of
Scientology attempted to re-register, the state refused, asserting that the
purpose and activities of the Church of Scientology contradicted Russian law
and that the registration materials were incomplete; the Church of Scientology
resubmitted its materials numerous times but was unable to register before the

organization as a “religion” if it does not practice black magic or study paranormal activity, as criminalized by
LOLR Article 3.2. Motilla, supra note 53, at 589–90; see also Martínez-Torrón, supra note 46, at 744. For a
discussion of the difficulties of providing a legal definition of religion, see RAFAEL PALOMINO LOZANO,
RELIGIÓN Y DERECHO COMPARADO (2006).
162 S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001, No. 46, in B.O.E. n. 65 (supp.), Mar. 16, 2001, p. 83, FJ 8, at 88–89.
163 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 46, at 744.
164 Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 5 (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (“Las Iglesias, Confesiones y
Comunidades religiosas y sus federaciones gozarán de personalidad jurídica una vez inscritas en el
correspondiente Registro público, que se crea, a tal efecto en el Ministerio de Justicia.”).
165 JIM MURDOCH, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION: A GUIDE TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 45 (2007).
166 Id.
167 Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 18147/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 6–11 (Apr. 5,
2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-80038.
168 Id. para. 58.
169 Id. para. 59.
170 Id. para. 60.
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year 2000.171 Fearing judicial dissolution, the church appealed to the European
Court of Human Rights and argued that Russia violated Articles 9, 10, and 11
of the ECHR.172 Interpreting Article 9’s grant of religious freedom in light of
Article 11’s grant of free association, the court held that the public order
exception must be construed strictly when it implicates association and must
correspond to a pressing social need.173 Although the state may refuse to
register a religion that fails to present information on its basic tenets and creed,
the Church of Scientology did provide information on its basic tenets.174
Furthermore, because the Church of Scientology had lawfully existed and
operated in Russia for three years prior to the 1997 law and because the state
could not prove that the community or its individual members had breached
any domestic law, the state’s refusal to re-register the church had no legal
basis.175
The registration requirements in Church of Scientology Moscow are very
similar to the registration requirements in Spanish law. Both Spain and Russia
require a religious entity to prove it has a legitimate group of followers who
adhere to a common set of religious beliefs. But unlike the 1997 law in Church
of Scientology Moscow, the Spanish Constitution requires state neutrality with
respect to religion.
The European Court of Human Rights also found that the state did not have
proper grounds for refusing recognition in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia
v. Moldova. In that case the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, which is a
local autonomous Orthodox church in Moldova, applied for recognition five
times between 1992 and 1997.176 Each time the state refused to recognize the
church, arguing that it was a schismatic group within the Metropolitan Church
of Moldova, and that recognition of the Church of Bessarabia would create a
conflict with the Church of Moldova.177 The church challenged the refusal in
the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the refusal violated Articles
9 and 11 of the ECHR because state recognition is necessary to practice
religion in Moldova, and that the state action was not protected by the public
order exception because it was not required in a democratic society.178 The
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id. paras. 8–20.
Id. paras. 64, 68–70.
Id. paras. 74–75, 86.
Id. para. 93.
Id. paras. 96–97.
Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, paras. 11, 13–22, at 89–91.
Id. paras. 97–98, at 108–09.
Id. para. 95, at 107–08.
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court agreed, holding that because Moldovan law allowed only registered
religions to practice, the state’s refusal to recognize the Metropolitan Church
of Bessarabia violated its adherent’s freedom of religion.179 Further, the refusal
was not exempted by Article 9(2) of the ECHR because, although the state
may limit the freedom of one religion in order to prevent conflict between
several religions or to reconcile the conflicting beliefs of various religions, it
must do this in a way that is neutral.180 Neutrality means the state cannot assess
the legitimacy of religious beliefs.181 When the state argued that the Church of
Bessarabia was merely a schism of the Church of Moldova, it made a value
judgment about the legitimacy of the tenets of the Church of Bessarabia, and
therefore violated its duty of neutrality.182
The case of the Church of Bessarabia is distinguishable from the Spanish
registration requirement because in Spain all people may form communities to
practice their faith without interference by the state, even if they have not
officially registered as a religious organization.183 A legal personality is not
required for a religion to realize the full panoply of constitutional protections.
All religions are guaranteed religious freedom under Article 16 of the
constitution, regardless of whether they are officially recognized. Furthermore,
although registration in the Registry of Religious Entities is important because
it is the state’s way to recognize a religion as a juridical person, nonregistration does not impair a religion’s constitutional rights. Article 16.1
guarantees religious freedom “with no other restriction than may be necessary
to maintain public order.”184 Legal personality is not a condition for the
exercise of religious freedom in Spain; the state must protect the religious
rights of individuals and groups from all religions, not merely registered
religions. Additionally, a religious group that is not allowed to register as a
religious entity can obtain legal personality through registration in the Registry
of Associations.185

179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. para. 105, at 110.
Id. paras. 115–16, at 113.
Id. para. 123, 116–17.
Id.
See C.E. art. 16.1, B.O.E. n.311, Dec. 29, 1978.
Id. (translated from Spanish).
Martínez-Torrón, supra note 45, at 741 n.97.
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b. Bilateral Cooperation Agreements
The second way the state cooperates with religious organizations is by
signing bilateral agreements outlining areas for cooperation. Article 7 of the
LOLR provides that the state may establish agreements of cooperation with the
religions that are deeply rooted in Spanish society.186 Cooperation agreements
are very important because they are a concrete mechanism through which a
religion can negotiate for specific protections from the state. Through a
cooperation agreement the state can extend fiscal benefits to a religious
organization,187 can recognize feast days,188 and can provide religious services
for Spaniards in prisons, institutions, and other public facilities.189
To date, the Spanish government has created cooperation agreements with
four religious denominations: the Catholic Church, the Protestant Federation,
the Islamic Federation, and the Jewish Federation.190 Four other religions were
found to be deeply rooted in Spanish society: the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Buddhist Federation, and the
Orthodox Churches.191 The Orthodox Church was accepted into the Protestant
186 The LOLR uses the term of art “notorio arraigo” to describe religions that are deeply rooted in Spanish
society. Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 7 (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (Spain). The term “notorio arraigo” does
not have an English translation. The Spanish Department of Religious Affairs translates it as “notorious
influence.” SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 44 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa María Martínez de
Codes eds., 1998). But, the word “notorious” has a negative connotation and does not adequately express the
fact that the religion must be deeply-rooted. Therefore, this Comment translates the term “notorio arraigo” to
“deeply rooted in Spanish society.”
Article 7 of the LOLR measures the roots of a religion by the area and number of believers. Ley
Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 7.1 (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (“El Estado, teniendo en cuenta las creencias
religiosas existente en la sociedad española, establecerá en su caso, Acuerdos o Convenios de cooperación con
las Iglesias, Confesiones y Comunidades religiosas inscritas en el registro que por su ámbito y número de
creyentes hayan alcanzado notorio arraigo en España. En todo caso, estos Acuerdos se aprobarán por ley de las
Cortes Generales.”).
187 Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa art. 7.2 (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (“En los Acuerdos o Convenios, y
respetando siempre el principio de igualdad, se podrá extended a dichas Iglesias, Confesiones y Comunidades
los beneficios fiscales previstos en el ordenamiento jurídico general para las entidades sin fin de lucro y demás
de carácter benéfico.”).
188 Id. art. 2.
189 Id. arts. 8, 9.1.
190 See Acuerdo entre el estado español y la santa sede sobre asuntos jurídicos (B.O.E. 1976, 300) (Spain)
[hereinafter 1979 Concordat I]; Protestant Federation Cooperation Agreement (B.O.E. 1992, 24) (Spain)
[hereinafter FEREDE Agreement]; Jewish Federation Cooperation Agreement (B.O.E. 1992, 25) (Spain)
[hereinafter Jewish Agreement]; Islamic Federation Cooperation Agreement (B.O.E. 1992, 26) (Spain)
[hereinafter Islamic Agreement]. See infra Part II for discussion of the Concordat of 1979.
191 International Religious Freedom Report 2010, supra note 5; Notorio Arraigo, FUNDACIÓN
PLURALISMO Y CONVIVENCIA, www.pluralismoyconvivencia.es/materiales_didacticos/glosario/notorio_arraigo
(last visited May 6, 2013); see also Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 796 n.51.
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Federation and now receives the benefits of the Protestant cooperation
agreement.192 The other three do not have bilateral agreements with the state.
Because cooperation agreements are only available for religions that are
deeply-rooted in Spanish society, the mechanism by which the Spanish state
interacts with religions favors those religions. Formal cooperation agreements
make it easier for Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and Protestants to negotiate with
the state. Further, the state has not identified objective criteria to determine
whether a denomination is deeply rooted in Spanish society and reserves the
right to refuse to negotiate with any religious group regardless of whether it is
deeply rooted in Spanish society.193 For example, although the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints has more members than the entire Jewish
Federation and scholars argue that the Latter-day Saints are deeply rooted in
Spanish society, the state has refused to negotiate a cooperation agreement
with them.194 This might be a violation of the constitutional requirement of
equality.
The European Court of Human Rights has held that mild forms of state
preference for one religion over another do not violate the Convention. For
example, in Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, Austrian authorities banned a
film that was offensive to Roman Catholics.195 The court upheld the ban in
light of the clear Roman Catholic majority in the region.196 Additionally, a
state may treat different religious groups differently without violating the
ECHR, as long as there is a reasonable and objective justification for the
different treatment. In Alujer Fernández and Caballero García v. Spain, the
Court held that arrangements which favor particular religious communities do
not, in principle, “contravene the requirements of [Article 9], provided that
there is an objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment
and that similar agreements may be entered into by other [c]hurches willing to
do so.”197
The European Court found no objective and reasonable justification for a
Spanish law that provided a pension plan for Catholic priests but not for
192 Ortodoxos y Orientales, FUNDACIÓN PLURALISMO Y CONVIVENCIA, www.pluralismoyconvivencia.es/
materiales_didacticos/glosario/ortodoxos_y_orientales (last visited May 6, 2013); see also Combalía & Roca,
supra note 1, at 633.
193 Motilla, supra note 53, at 584.
194 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 777 n.75; Martínez-Torrón, supra note 46, at 718 n.13.
195 Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34, 52 (1994).
196 Id.
197 Alujer Fernández & Caballero García v. Spain, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 487.
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Evangelical ministers.198 In Manzanas Martín v. Spain, the petitioner worked
as an Evangelical minister for forty years but when he retired in 1991 and
applied to receive social security benefits the department of social security
refused to grant a pension, stating that work as a minister for the Evangelical
Church did not qualify as pensionable service.199 Spanish social security law in
1991 did provide pensions for Catholic priests, but protestant ministers were
not granted pensions until the 1992 cooperation agreement with the Protestant
Federation.200 The petitioner challenged the department’s decision in the
Barcelona Labor Court; the court ruled that the social security law gave
preferential treatment to Catholic priests.201 On appeal, the superior court of
Catalonia reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that because the
petitioner retired before the Protestant Federation negotiated pension rights the
action of the social security department was lawful.202 The petitioner then
challenged the constitutionality of the social security law, but the
Constitutional Court upheld the law.203 He appealed to the European Court of
Human Rights, asserting that Spain had violated Article 14 of the ECHR.204
Spain argued that it had not reached an agreement with regard to social
security rights for protestant ministers until 1992.205 The European Court did
not find this argument convincing, noting that Spain had the forethought to
incorporate Catholic priests into the social security scheme in 1977 and it
should have revised this in 1978 after granting equality to all religions.206

198 Manzanas Martín v. Spain, App. No. 17966/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110885#{“itemid”:[“001-110885”]}.
199 Id. paras. 5–8.
200 Catholic priests were included in the social security regime by Royal Decree in 1977. Royal Decree
2398/1977 which regulates the Clergy Social Security, art. 1 (B.O.E. 1977, 224) (“Los Clérigos de la Iglesia
Católica y demás Ministros de otras Iglesias y Confesiones Religiosas debidamente inscritas en el
correspondiente Registro del Ministerio de Jusitcia quedarán incluidos en el ámbito de aplicación del Régimen
General de la Seguridad Social, en las condiciones que reglamentariamente se determinen . . . . Quedan
asimilados a trabajadores por cuenta ajena, a efectos de su inclusión en el Régimen General de la Seguridad
Social.”). Protestant ministers and preachers were incorporated to the regime by the FEREDE Agreement in
1992 and in 1999 by Royal Decree 369/1999. FEREDE Agreement, supra note 190; Royal Decree 369/1999
on terms and conditions for inclusion in the General System of Social Security for religious ministers of the
churches belonging to the Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities of Spain (B.O.E. 1999, 64).
201 Manzanas Martín, App. No. 17966/10, para. 11.
202 Id. para. 13 (stating that because the petitioner retired in 1991, he was therefore not incorporated into
the social security scheme, either by the Royal Decree or by the FEREDE Agreement).
203 Id.
204 Id. para. 44.
205 Id. para. 53.
206 Id.
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Therefore the Court held that there was no reasonable justification for the
state’s refusal to grant pensions to protestant ministers.207
The European Court’s requirement of a reasonable and objective
justification for state discrimination on the basis of religion accords with
Spain’s provision for religious equality.208 Spain’s system of bilateral
cooperation agreements stems from its Constitutional obligation to cooperate
with “the Catholic Church and the other religions.”209 Article 16.3 is prefaced
by the statement “there will be no state religion.”210 The requirement to
cooperate with all religions, therefore, is a way to guarantee that the state does
not become confessional. It does not give a right to individuals.211 The state’s
decision to limit bilateral cooperation agreements to religions that are deeply
rooted in society is a reasonable limitation to a vague provision in the
constitution.
The requirement that the state cooperate with religions is also in line with
European norms of religious freedom because it does not permit the state to
violate the Constitution’s provisions for state neutrality (Article 16.3) or
equality (Article 14). For example, the Court has held that when state
cooperation with a religious group works to the disadvantage of other religious
groups, difference in treatment must be supported by a reasonable and
objective determination.212 For example, in STC 340/1993 the Court held that
eminent domain laws which were more favorable to the Catholic Church than
to other religious organizations were not necessary in a democratic society.213
The Law of Urban Leasing in effect in 1993 gave a landlord the right to break
a lease and reclaim his property when the landlord could prove he needed the
property for personal use.214 The Law exempted certain groups from the proof
requirement, including national, provincial, and municipal governments, and
the Catholic Church.215 This meant that when the Catholic Church acted as
landlord it could break the lease and reclaim the property without
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

Id. paras. 55–57.
See supra Part I.B.2.
C.E. art. 16.3, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (translated from Spanish).
Id. (translated from Spanish).
See, e.g., S.T.C., Nov. 8, 1983, No. 93, in B.O.E. n. 288 (supp.), Dec. 2, 1983, p. 18 (Spain).
See supra Part I.B.2.
S.T.C., Nov. 16, 1993, No. 340, in B.O.E. n. 295 (supp.), Dec. 10, 1993, p. 81 (Spain).
Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos arts. 70–75 (B.O.E. 1964, 312) (Spain) (replaced by B.O.E. 1994,

282).
215 Id. art. 76.1 (“Cuando el Estado, la Provincia, el Municipio, la Iglesia Católica y las Corporaciones de
Derecho Público tengan que ocupar sus propias fincas para establecer sus oficinas o servicios, no vendrán
obligados a justificar la necesidad.”).
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justification.216 Other religions, however, did need to provide justification for a
taking.217 The Court held that when the law exempted the Catholic Church
from having to prove that it needed to occupy the property for personal use,
this treatment violated the constitutional principle of equality because religious
organizations in identical situations were not treated equally under the law.218
Although the Constitution requires state cooperation with the Catholic Church,
the Court held that this is not a reasonable justification for treating the Catholic
Church differently from other religions.219
The principle of state cooperation recognizes that the church and the state
seek many of the same goals, and therefore ensures that they will work
together. It provides an interesting corollary to both the neutrality and equality
principles, but does not contradict them. Although the state must cooperate
with the Catholic Church, it must also cooperate with every other religion as
necessary in a democratic society. Because cooperation is not limited to one
church, the cooperation principle does not violate the earlier principles of
neutrality and equality. The state cannot use its cooperation to uphold one
religion as more worthy than the others. Therefore, the cooperation principle
does not infringe on the rights of minority religions.
II. THE 1979 CONCORDATS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
One week after guaranteeing freedom of religion to all citizens and
mandating that the state cooperate with religions, Spain entered an agreement
with the Catholic Church to carve out specific applications of that cooperation.
State and religious officials agreed that a new concordat was necessary because
the previous concordat was not compatible with the new constitution.220
Notably, the government did not question whether a concordat should govern
216

See id.
S.T.C., Nov. 8, 1983, No. 93, in B.O.E. n. 288 (supp.), Dec. 2, 1983, p. 18.
218 Id. FJ 4(a), at 91.
219 Id.
220 The preamble to the 1976 Concordat reads “in view of the profound transformation that Spain has
experienced in the last years . . . Spain and the Vatican judge it necessary to regulate through specific
agreements matters of common interest . . . .” Acuerdo sobre renuncia a la presentación de obispos y al
privilegio del fuero (B.O.E. 1976, 18294) (Spain) (translated from Spanish) (“A la vista del profundo proceso
de transformación que la sociedad española ha experimentado en estos últimos años . . . juzgan necesario
regular mediante Acuerdos específicos las materias de interés común . . . .”). The 1976 concordat was limited
to a discussion of the state’s ability to select bishops and to prosecute a member of the clergy. The 1979
Concordats set forth a much more detailed description of the rights and responsibilities of the Spanish State
and the Catholic Church, and therefore it is the agreement on which this Comment will focus. See MartínezTorrón, supra note 1, at 794.
217
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church-state relations.221 Given the numerous changes enacted by the 1978
Constitution, state officials could have dispensed with concordats altogether.
Perhaps afraid of backlash similar to the reaction to the 1931 Constitution,222
politicians used the new concordat to curry favor among Spain’s most
influential bishops, who then presented the transition to democracy to their
congregations as a positive change for Spain.223
Before analyzing the particular provisions of the Concordats of 1979, it is
important to understand how the Concordat fits into the Spanish legal scheme.
A concordat is an instrument of international law for two reasons: (1) it is a
bilateral treaty between two subjects of international law, each sovereign in its
own sphere; and (2) it is negotiated, signed, and ratified according to the norms
of international practice.224 The Concordat of 1979 is a bilateral agreement
between the Spanish state and the Holy See, which is the sovereign entity of
the Catholic Church.225 It was negotiated, signed, and ratified by Spanish
Parliament, as required by Article 94 of the Constitution.226 Therefore, it is a
treaty.
In Spain, treaties are superior to the internal law of the state and are equal
in rank to the constitution.227 If the concordat conflicts with the constitution,

221

Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 794.
In the 1930s Republican legislators, who were determined to reduce the Church’s social influence,
declared invalid all previous agreements with the Catholic Church. But because they made no attempt to
reconcile the entrenched position of the Church, they alienated many politically influential Catholics, including
high-ranking military officers, and provided the spark that ignited the Spanish Civil War. See id. at 788–89.
223 Id. at 789.
224 Roland Minnerath, The Position of the Catholic Church Regarding Concordats from a Doctrinal and
Pragmatic Perspective, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 467, 468 (1998); see also Willibald M. Plöchl, Reflections on the
Nature and Status of Concordats, 7 JURIST 10 (1947).
225 The Church claims for herself the right to conclude treaties, create legislation, and deal with states in
the field of international law. 1983 CODE C.3, 255, 265–67 (Catholic Church).
226 MARÍA JOSÉ CIÁURRIZ, LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN EL DERECHO ESPAÑOL: LA LEY ORGÁNICA DE
LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA 96 (1984); see also C.E. art. 94, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“La prestación del
consentimiento del Estado para obligarse por medio de tratados o convenios requerirá la previa autorización de
las Cortes Generales, en los siguientes casos . . . (e) [t]ratados o convenios que supongan modificación o
derogación de alguna ley o exijan medidas legislativas para su ejecución.”).
227 CIÁURRIZ, supra note 226, at 96–97. A first draft of the Constitution stated that international treaties
have a higher place in the Spanish legal system than the domestic law. Id. at 97 n.11. The final version of the
constitution was not as clear about the superiority of treaties over domestic law, instead saying “treaties may
only be modified or suspended in the form contemplated by the treaty or in accordance with international law.”
C.E. art. 96.1, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (translated from Spanish) (“Los tratados internacionales
válidamente celebrados, una vez publicados oficialmente en España, formarán parte del ordenamiento interno.
Sus disposiciones sólo podrán ser derogadas, modificadas o suspendidas en la forma prevista en los propios
tratados o de acuerdo con las normas generales del Derecho internacional.”).
222

CURVINO GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

7/16/2013 10:34 AM

CHURCH-STATE COOPERATION

543

the Constitutional Court must review it.228 Because the concordat is a treaty, it
can only be amended or suspended by consent of the Spanish government and
the Holy See, as provided by the concordat’s terms.229 Therefore, it is
important that the concordat is compatible with the constitution.230
The Concordat of 1979 comports with the constitution’s principles of
neutrality and equality, and is a legitimate use of the doctrine of state
cooperation with religion. This Section will outline the main points of the 1979
Concordat below: (A) state recognition of Catholic rites; (B) foreign
sovereignty of the Catholic Church; (C) Catholic religious education in public
schools; and (D) state economic support for the Catholic Church. It will
analyze each provision in light of the previously-outlined Constitutional
framework for religious freedom, and will argue that the Concordat is
consistent with the rights afforded by the Constitution and by the LOLR.
A. State Recognition of Catholic Rites
First, the concordat recognizes the Catholic Church’s right to free and
public exercise of religious activities.231 Sundays are recognized as holy
days,232 Catholic marriage rites are civilly valid,233 and all people have the
right to attend Catholic mass, even the people in public institutions, such as
hospitals and prisons.234

228 C.E. art. 95, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“La celebración de un tratado internacional que
contenga estipulaciones contrarias a la Constitución exigirá la previa revisión constitucional.”).
229 International treaties can only be modified or suspended in the form contemplated by the treaty. Id. art.
96.1 (“Los tratados internacionales válidamente celebrados, una vez publicados oficialmente en España,
formarán parte del ordenamiento interno. Sus disposiciones sólo podrán ser derogadas, modificadas o
suspendidas en la forma prevista en los propios tratados o de acuerdo con las normas generales del Derecho
internacional.”). The 1979 Concordat contemplates that the Holy See and the Spanish government will work
together to resolve any problems that arise in the interpretation or application of the Concordat. 1979
Concordat I, supra note 190, art. 4.2.
230 E.U. Network of Indep. Experts on Fundamental Rights, The Right to Conscientious Objection and the
Conclusion by EU Member States of Concordats with the Holy See, at 6 (Opinion No. 4-2005, Dec. 14, 2005).
231 1979 Concordat I, supra note 190, art. 1.1 (“El Estado Español reconoce a la Iglesia Católica el
derecho de ejercer su misión apostólica y le garantiza el libre y público ejercicio de las actividades que le son
propias y en especial las de culto, jurisdicción y magisterio.”).
232 Id. art. 3 (“El Estado reconoce como días festivos todos los domingos.”).
233 Id. art. 6 (“El Estado reconoce los efectos civiles al matrimonio celebrado según las normas del
Derecho Canónico.”).
234 Id. art. 4.1 (“El Estado reconoce y garantiza el ejercicio del derecho a la asistencia religiosa de los
ciudadanos internados en establecimientos penitenciarios, hospitales . . . tanto privados como públicos.”).
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These rights are facially consistent with the rights afforded by the
cooperation agreements with Judaism, Islam, and the Protestant churches.235
However in practice, the State’s recognition of Catholic rites is broader than its
recognition of the rites of the Jewish, Protestant, and Islamic Federations. For
instance, when a canonical court annuls a Catholic marriage, this
pronouncement will have civil effect as soon as a civil court approves it.236 The
civil court may accept an annulment on the motion of one party; the other party
may object to procedural due process, but not to the substantive elements of
the decision.237 In contrast, the marital decisions of Jewish and Islamic
religious courts do not receive civil effect.238 Similarly, the state’s recognition
of Catholic holy days is broader than its recognition of Jewish or Islamic holy
days. For example, although the Jewish Cooperation Agreement recognizes
Saturday as a holy day and allows for Saturday as a day of rest from work,239
the Constitutional Court has held that private employers are not required to
provide a day of rest on Saturday.240
Although the State’s recognition of Catholic rites in the Concordat is
broader than its recognition of the rites of other religious groups, this does not
violate the Constitution’s requirement of equality because there is a reasonable
and objective justification for the different treatment.241 The pronouncements
of Catholic marital tribunals are afforded great respect by Spanish civil courts
due to the State’s centuries-long history of accepting the adjudications of
ecclesiastical courts.
The rights afforded by the Concordat are also consistent with the rights
afforded to emerging religions, that is, those that are not deeply rooted in
Spanish society. All Spaniards are free to practice any religion of their

235 Recognition of the validity of religious marriage is provided in Article 7 of each Cooperation
Agreement. See, e.g., FEREDE Agreement, supra note 190, art. 7 (“Se reconocen los efectos civiles a del
matrimonio celebrado según la forma religiosa ante los ministros de culto de las Iglesias pertenecientes . . . .”).
Articles 8 and 9.1 of each Cooperation Agreement provide for religious services in public institutions. See id.
The agreements for Islam and Judaism allow followers to miss work and school on their religious holy days as
a substitute for Catholic holy days. See, e.g., Islamic Agreement, supra note 190, art. 12; Jewish Agreement,
supra note 190, art. 12.
236 Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Religion, supra note 46, at 729.
237 S.T.C., Nov. 8, 1983, No. 93, in B.O.E. n. 288 (supp.), Dec. 2, 1983, p. 18, FJ 2, at 20 (Spain).
238 Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Religion, supra note 46, at 729. The Protestant Federation does not have
religious courts. Id.
239 Jewish Agreement, supra note 190, art. 12.
240 See supra Part I.B.2.
241 See Part I.B, supra, for a discussion of Articles 16.1 and 9.2 of the Spanish Constitution and Article
1.2 of the LOLR.
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choosing and are free to form religious communities. Freedom of religion and
freedom of association are fundamental individual rights, “given without the
need for legislation.”242 The legislature has said that fundamental rights, such
as freedom of religion, apply to communities formed to carry out the rights and
that the communities do not need to be authorized or inscribed in a public
register to enjoy freedom of religion.243 The rites and ceremonies of all
religions may not be restricted unless necessary to maintain public order244 and
adherents of these religions may not be discriminated against.245
Finally, the Concordat carefully provides that Catholic public worship will
not infringe the religious rights of non-Catholics.246 The recognition of
Catholic rites was not meant to coerce the followers of other religions to
convert to Catholicism. It was merely meant to take into account the religious
beliefs of the Spanish society, as required by Article 16.3 of the Constitution.
The Constitution allows all religions to proclaim their beliefs publically, as
long as this proclamation does not infringe on another’s right to freedom of
conscience. The recognition of Catholic rites in the Concordat of 1979 does not
so infringe, therefore it is constitutional.
B. Foreign Sovereignty of the Catholic Church
Second, the Concordat recognizes the juridical rights of the Catholic
Church. It provides that the Catholic Church may organize itself freely, and
create dioceses, parishes, and other religious congregations that have legal
personality.247 The State agreed to respect the inviolability of the land,

242

FEREDE Agreement, supra note 190 (translated from Spanish).
See, e.g., Islamic Agreement, supra note 190, pmbl. (“Estos derechos, concebidos originariamente
como derechos individuales de los ciudadanos, alcanzan también, por derivación, a las Comunidades o
Confesiones en que aquellos se integran para el cumplimiento comunitario de sus fines religiosos, sin
necesidad de autorización previa, ni de su inscripción en ningún registro público.”).
244 See supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of the grant of freedom of conscience and worship in Article 16.1
of the Spanish Constitution.
245 See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of the grant of religious equality in Article 14 of the Spanish
Constitution.
246 1979 Concordat I, supra note 229, art. 4.2 (“El régimen de asistencia religiosa católica y la actividad
pastoral de los centros mencionados que sean de carácter público serán regulados de común acuerdo entre las
competentes Autoridades de la Iglesia y del Estado. En todo caso, quedará salvaguardado el derecho a la
libertad religiosa de las personas y el debido respeto a sus principios religiosos y éticos.”).
247 Id. art. 1.2 (“La Iglesia puede organizarse libremente. En particular, puede crear, modificar o suprimir
Diócesis, Parroquias y otras circunscripciones territoriales, que gozarán de personalidad jurídica civil en
cuanto la tengan canónica y ésta sea notificada a los órganos competentes del Estado.”).
243
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buildings, archives, registers, and documents of the church.248 Additionally, the
State recognized the Catholic Church of Spain’s foreign sovereignty.249
Spain does not grant foreign sovereignty to any other religious
organization. The reasons for this difference are historical and legal.
Historically, the Catholic Church has claimed sovereignty in international
affairs, and states have recognized that the papacy is the supreme authority of
the Church over political, national, and cultural borders.250 Other religions do
not have a similar historical claim to sovereignty. Legally, sovereignty cannot
be granted—an actor either is sovereign or is not.251 The cooperation
agreements with the Protestant, Islamic, and Jewish Federations, which are
internal settlements made according to the domestic law of Spain,252 therefore
cannot grant sovereignty to these religious organizations.
The Church’s right to organize itself freely is a direct implementation of the
active requirement that the state remove obstacles to the free exercise of
religion.253 The cooperation agreements with Judaism, Islam, and the
Protestant Federation make their respective places of worship inviolable.254
Religions that are not deeply rooted in Spanish society can expect a similar
level of state protection because the right to gather publicly to profess religion
is protected for all religions by LOLR Article 1.2. Therefore, these provisions
of the Concordat are constitutional.

248 Id. art. 1.5–.6 (“Los lugares de culto tienen garantizada su inviolabilidad con arreglo a las
Leyes. . . . El Estado respecta y protege la inviolabilidad de los archivos, registros y demás documentos
pertenecientes a la Conferencia Episcopal Española, a las Curias . . . y a otras Instituciones y Entidades
eclesiásticas.”).
249 Id. art. 1.2 (“Ninguna parte del Territorio español dependerá de Obispo cuya sede se encuentre en
territorio sometido a la soberanía de otro Estado, y ninguna Diócesis o circunscripción territorial española
comprenderá zonas de territorio sujeto a soberanía extranjera.”). The practical application of foreign
sovereignty means any internal disputes will be resolved by the local bishop. If he cannot resolve the dispute,
it will proceed to a higher authority in the Holy See. Cases brought against the church as an institution must be
resolved with reference to international law, just as if a claim were brought against a foreign state. Foreign
sovereignty of the church does not give individuals the right to break civil laws, and the state may bring
individual clergy before domestic courts.
250 1983 CODE C.3, 255, 265–67 (Catholic Church); see also Minnerath, supra note 224, at 468.
251 See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 52 (3d ed. 2010) (“The essence of
statehood is sovereignty, the principle that each nation answers only to its own domestic order and is not
accountable to a larger international community, save only to the extent it has consented to do so.”).
252 Minnerath, supra note 224, at 468.
253 See supra Part I.B.1.b for a discussion of Article 9.2 of the Spanish Constitution.
254 E.g., FEREDE Agreement, supra note 190, art. 2.
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C. Catholic Religious Education in Public Schools
Third, the concordat recognizes the fundamental importance of religious
education and therefore gives the Catholic Church the right to teach the
Catholic faith to all people.255 The Holy See may communicate with the
Church in Spain and publish information to the clergy and the faithful.256
Public schools must offer Catholic religious education classes,257 with
curriculum overseen by the Church and teachers authorized by the relevant
bishop,258 to any child who desires Catholic religious education.259
Additionally, the state guaranteed that public school teaching would respect
Christian ethics.260
The Jewish, Islamic, and Protestant cooperation agreements provide similar
rights for religious education. The followers of these religions may freely
disseminate publications,261 oversee the religious curriculum taught in public
schools,262 and control the hiring and firing of religious education teachers.263
In 2004, the government approved legislation that mandates funding for
Protestant, Islamic, and Judaic instruction in public schools when at least ten
students request it.264 In this respect, the state treats Catholic religious
education differently from Protestant, Muslim, and Jewish religious
education—Catholic students do not have to request religious education.
However, this difference is not discriminatory because it has an objective
justification. Given Spain’s majority Catholic population it would be
unreasonable for every school to teach Jewish, Protestant, or Muslim religious
255 Acuerdo entre el Estado español y la Santa Sede sobre enseñaza y asuntos culturales (B.O.E. 1979,
29491) (Spain) [hereinafter 1979 Concordat II] (“El Estado reconoce el derecho fundamental a la educación
religiosa . . . .”).
256 1979 Concordat I, supra note 229, art. 2 (“La Santa Sede podrá promulgar y publicar libremente
cualquier disposición referente al gobierno de la Iglesia y comunicar sin impedimento con los Prelados, el
Clero y los fieles, así como ellos podrán hacerlo con la Santa Sede.”).
257 1979 Concordat II, supra note 255, art. 2 (“[I]ncluirán la enseñaza de la religión católica en todos los
Centros de Educación . . . .”).
258 Id. art. 6 (“A la Jerarquía eclesiástica corresponde señalar los contenidos de la enseñaza y formación
religiosa católica, así como proponer los libros de texto y material didáctico relativos a dicha enseñanza v
formación.”).
259 Id. art. 2 (“Por respeto a la libertad de conciencia, dicha enseñaza no tendrá carácter obligatorio para
los alumnos. Se garantiza, sin embargo, el derecho a recibirla.”).
260 Id. art. 1 (“[L]a educación que se imparta en los centros docentes públicos será respetuosa con los
valores de la ética cristiana.”).
261 E.g., FEREDE Agreement, supra note 190, art. 11.2(a).
262 Id. art. 10.
263 Id.
264 International Religious Freedom Report 2010, supra note 5.
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education classes without first ascertaining whether students would want to
take these classes.
Unlike the four religions with cooperation agreements, emerging religions
are not entitled to provide religious instruction in public schools.265 However,
the Constitution does protect freedom of conscience in public schools. Article
27 states that the purpose of education is for the full development of the human
personality.266 To this end, public education must respect the parental right to
direct the religious and moral education of their children.267 Non-Catholic
students are not required to take Catholic religious education classes in
school.268 To avoid infringement of the rights of non-Catholics, the Church
agreed to coordinate its educational principles with civil education.269 In light
of the principle of individual liberty outlined in Section 2.1 of the LOLR,270
and Article 27 of the Constitution, the Concordat reaffirmed the fundamental
parental right to choose their children’s moral and religious education.271
Furthermore, followers of every religion may provide religious education
for their children through homeschooling or by enrolling them in private
religious schools.272 Although public schools do not provide religious
education for emerging religions, these religions can teach their faith in other
public areas.273 Additionally, the state provides a limited fund for cultural,

265

Martínez-Torrón, supra note 155, at 140.
C.E. art. 27.2, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“La educación tendrá por objeto el pleno
desarrollo de la personalidad humana en el respeto a los principios democráticos de convivencia y a los
derechos y libertades fundamentales.”).
267 Id. art. 27.3 (“Los poderes públicos garantizan el derecho que asiste a los padres para que sus hijos
reciban la formación religiosa y moral que esté de acuerdo con sus propias convicciones.”).
268 Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Religion, supra note 46, at 732.
269 1979 Concordat II, supra note 255, pmbl. (“La Iglesia debe coordinar su misión educativa con los
principios de libertad civil en material, religiosa, y con los derechos de las familias evitando cualquier
discriminación o situación privilegiada.”); Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Religion, supra note 46, at 732.
270 The LOLR recognizes the right to choose the religious education you wish to receive. Ley Orgánica de
Libertad Religiosa art. 2.1 (B.O.E., 1980, 7) (“La libertad religiosa y de culto garantizada por la Constitución
comprende, con la consiguiente inmunidad de coacción, el derecho de toda persona a . . . (c) [r]ecibir e
impartir enseñaza e información religiosa . . . dentro y fuera del ámbito escolar, la educación religiosa y moral
que esté de acuerdo con sus propias convicciones.”).
271 1979 Concordat II, supra note 255, art. 1 (“A la luz del principio de libertad religiosa, la acción
educativa respetará el derecho fundamental de los padres sobre la educación moral y religiosa de sus hijos en
el ámbito escolar.”).
272 C.E. art. 27.3, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“Los poderes públicos garantizan el derecho que
asiste a los padres para que sus hijos reciban la formación religiosa y moral que esté de acuerdo con sus
propias convicciones.”); International Religious Freedom Report 2010, supra note 5.
273 C.E. art. 16.1, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain); see also supra notes 91–94.
266
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educational, and social programs to teach the tenets of minority religions
outside of a school setting.274
Spain’s Constitutional Court has heard a number of cases concerning
religion in public schools. One area of contention has been the Catholic
Church’s right to authorize religious education teachers—before a school may
hire an individual to teach Catholic religion classes, the local bishop must
authorize the teacher to teach religion on behalf of the Church, and the bishop
may refuse to authorize any teacher he considers inappropriate.275 Because the
state can only hire Catholic religious education teachers authorized by the local
bishop, the bishop’s power is broad. To ensure that a bishop’s right to
authorize teachers does not infringe on other Constitutional rights, Spanish
courts may review these decisions.276
Courts must make two inquiries when reviewing a bishop’s decision to
authorize or not authorize a religious education teacher. First, they must
determine whether authorization was made with respect for the principles of
merit and capacity or on purely religious grounds.277 Authorization decisions
that are made with respect for the principles of merit and capacity are
presumptively valid.278 Authorization decisions that were made on purely
religious grounds must be respected by the state because the neutrality
provision of Article 16.3 of the constitution prohibits the state from making
value judgments on religious issues.279 Catholic religious education is a
religious act, meaning the church is responsible for defining the objectives and
the means of religious education.280 Therefore the church may set requirements
for its religious education teachers, and these requirements may include

274 In 2010 the state provided $6.2 million for such programs. International Religious Freedom Report
2010, supra note 5. Paradoxically, however, this fund typically goes to Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim
educational programs, and not programs for emerging religions. Id.
275 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 155, at 142.
276 S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2007, No. 38, in B.O.E. n. 63 (supp.), Mar. 14, 2007, p. 90, FJ 1, at 96 (Spain).
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.; see also supra Part I.B.3.
280 S.T.C., June 4, 2007, No. 128, in B.O.E. n. 161 (supp.), July 6, 2007, p. 4, FJ 4, at 14–15 (Spain)
(“[C]uando la propia autoridad eclesiástica que se pronunció favorablemente el emitir su juicio de idoneidad
en un acto de carácter puramente religioso, ajeno por completo al Derecho estatal, se pronuncia negativamente
en un momento posterior en razón de un juicio igualmente religioso, que en sí mismo no sea merecedor de un
reproche constitucional.”); see also S.T.C., Nov. 16, 1993, No. 340, in B.O.E. n. 295 (supp.), Dec. 10, 1993, A
5, at 84 (Spain) (stating that the religious objectives of religious education must be defined by the church, not
the state) S.T.C., May 13, 1982, No. 68, in B.O.E. n. 137 (supp.), June 9, 1982, p. 5 (Spain).
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religious or moral standards.281 As a practical matter, this means that in
addition to knowledge of the faith and teaching skill the church may consider a
teacher’s private and public behavior when deciding to grant or deny
authorization.
Second, courts must weigh the conflicting rights of the church to control
religious affairs and the teacher’s freedom of conscience.282 The Constitutional
Court explained this process of review in STC 38/2007. In that case, the bishop
revoked authorization from a teacher who had engaged in an extramarital
affair; subsequent to the revocation the school fired her.283 The teacher argued
that when the school fired her it discriminated on the basis of religion.284
Recalling that discrimination on the basis of religion is acceptable if there is a
reasonable and objective justification,285 the Court examined the church’s
decision to revoke ecclesiastical authorization from the teacher and the State’s
decision to fire the unauthorized teacher.286 Affirming that the church’s right to
teach religion includes the right to decide the qualifications of religion
teachers,287 and that the teacher’s failure to live according to Catholic moral
teaching directly related to her capacity to teach religion, the Court held that
the bishop used a religious justification.288 State neutrality therefore required
the school to accept this decision and fire the teacher.289 The Court then
weighed the conflicting rights of the parties. It weighed the Church’s right to
teach the faith guaranteed by Article 16.1 of the Constitution heavily, holding
that it would be unreasonable to simultaneously allow religious education in

281 S.T.C., June 4, 2007, No. 128, in B.O.E. n. 161 (supp.), July 6, 2007, p. 4, FJ 4, at 14 (“Si el acceso al
sistema docente público para impartir la enseñaza de un determinado credo religioso se soporta, en definitiva,
en el juicio de la autoridad religiosa sobre la idoneidad de la persona designada para enseñar la doctrina
correspondiente, con base en criterios estricta y exclusivamente religiosos o morales, no puede
romperse . . . .”). The Church can refuse to authorize a teacher who does not act as a witness to the faith,
practicing the doctrine she teaches. Id. FJ 7, at 17–18; see also S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2001, No. 46, in B.O.E. n. 65
(supp.), Mar. 16, 2001, p. 83 (Spain).
282 S.T.C., June 4, 2007, No. 128, in B.O.E. n. 161 (supp.), July 6, 2007, p. 4, FJ 2, p. 13–14.
283 S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2007, No. 38, in B.O.E. n. 63 (supp.), Mar. 14, 2007, p. 90, FJ 2, at 96–97.
284 Id. FJ 9, at 101–02.
285 Id. (citations omitted).
286 Id.
287 Id. FJ 9, at 101 (“La facultad reconocida a las autoridades eclesiásticas para determinar quiénes sean
las personas cualificadas para la enseñanza de su credo religioso constituye una garantía de libertad de las
Iglesias para la impartición de su doctrina sin injerencias del poder público.”).
288 Id.
289 Id.
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school but prohibit the Church from imposing qualification requirements.290
The Court minimized the teacher’s freedom of religion and freedom from
religious coercion guaranteed by Article 16.1 and 16.2,291 holding that
teacher’s rights were only implicated because she decided to become a
religious education teacher.292 Balancing the rights of the Church, which the
Court weighed heavily, against the rights of the teacher, which the Court
weighed lightly, the Court held that the rights of the Church outweighed the
rights of the teacher.293
The European Court of Human Rights approved this balancing test in
Fernández Martínez v. Spain.294 In the original case before the Spanish
Constitutional Court, STC 128/2007, the Court held that the Church did not
violate a teacher’s rights when it revoked authorization to teach. The petitioner
was ordained a priest in 1961 but applied for a dispensation from celibacy in
1984.295 Although he did not receive the dispensation until 1997, the petitioner
married in a civil ceremony in 1991 and had five children.296 Despite his
marriage, the petitioner received ecclesiastical authorization to teach religion
in October of 1991 and was employed as a Catholic religion teacher in a public
school.297 In 1996, the petitioner made public his disagreement with Church
dogma on celibacy of priests.298 In 1997, the bishop revoked the petitioner’s
teaching authorization and the school fired him.299 The Constitutional Court
used the same review procedure as it did in STC 38/2007: First, the Court
reviewed whether the bishop’s decision was purely religious;300 and second, it
weighed the Church’s right to teach the faith and the state’s duty of religious
neutrality against the teacher’s right to freedom of religion and expression.301
The Court held that the authorization was revoked after the petitioner
publicized his criticism of Church dogma, and therefore, the revocation of
290 Id. FJ 12, at 103 (“Resultaría sencillamente irrazonable que la enseñanza religiosa en los centros
escolares se llevase a cabo sin tomar en consideración como criterio de selección del profesorado las
convicciones religiosas de las personas que libremente deciden concurrir a los puestos de trabajo . . . .”).
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Fernández Martínez v. Spain, App. No. 56030/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 45 (May 15, 2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110916.
295 S.T.C., June 4, 2007, No. 128, in B.O.E. n. 161 (supp.), July 6, 2007, p. 4, A 2(a), at 4 (Spain).
296 Id. A 2(b), at 4.
297 Id. A 2(c), at 4.
298 Id. A 2(d), at 4.
299 Id.
300 Id. FJ 5, at 15–16.
301 Id. FJ 20, at 20–21.
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authority was based on purely religious grounds.302 Because the state is
required to be neutral in the face of religious decisions, and because the
revocation of authority to teach Catholicism is a religious decision, the state
was required to respect the Church’s decision.303 Weighing the rights of the
Church against the rights of the teacher, the Court commented that a special
relationship of trust exists between the Church and its religious education
teachers, such that the Church can reasonably expect teachers to agree with
Church doctrine and adhere to it.304 Citing STC 38/2007, the Court weighed
the rights of the Church more heavily than the rights of the teacher, holding
that it would be unreasonable to simultaneously allow religious education in
school but prohibit the Church from imposing qualification requirements.305
In its review of STC 128/2007, the European Court of Human Rights
agreed that the guarantee of religious freedom and the State’s obligation of
neutrality preclude it from questioning the bishop’s decision to revoke
authorization on purely religious grounds.306 Because the teacher’s public
criticism of Church doctrine broke the special relationship of trust between the
Church and its religious education teachers, the bishop was justified when he
revoked authorization from the teacher.307 The European Court also agreed that
the Constitutional Court’s process of weighing the constitutional rights of the
Church against those of the teacher struck a fair balance between the various
interests.308
Another case decided by the European Court of Human Rights confirms
that Spain’s treatment of religious education in public schools is in accordance
with European principles. In Lautsi v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of the
302 Id. FJ 5, at 16–17; accord id. FJ 5, at 17 (“Es claro que la información periodística publicada en el
diario ‘La Verdad,’ que se ha reproducido íntegramente a efectos meramente ilustrativos, ha sido la
desencadenante de la nota oficial de la oficina de información diocesana del Obispado de Cartagena antes
transcrita emitida en relación con los motivos que han determinado la baja definitiva del actor como profesor
de religión . . . .”).
303 Id. FJ 4, at 14–15; accord id. FJ 3, at 15 (“La neutralidad del Estado en relación con las diferentes
confesiones religiosas debe operar en similares términos cuando el juicio eclesiástico de idoneidad opera
positivamente en el momento de la eventual constitución de una inicial relación laboral que cuando, en sentido
contrario, opera negativamente a la hora de constituir una nueva relación laboral en un curso académico
posterior.”).
304 Id. FJ 10, at 20–21.
305 Id. FJ 11, at 22 ((citing S.T.C., Feb. 15, 2007, No. 38, in B.O.E. n. 63 (supp.), Mar. 14, 2007, p. 90, FJ
10, at 102 (Spain)).
306 Fernández Martínez v. Spain, App. No. 56030/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 84 (May 15, 2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-110916.
307 Id.
308 Id. para. 89.
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European Court held that a crucifix displayed in a public school classroom did
not violate the state’s duty of neutrality toward religion.309 The crucifix was a
passive symbol that did not amount to indoctrination in the Catholic faith or
intolerance of students who were non-believers.310 Because Catholicism is
deeply rooted in Italian culture, the Court held that the display of the crucifix
was acceptable.311 This is an important ruling for Spain due to Spain’s similar
history of Church entrenchment and its majority Catholic society. It shows that
ECHR Article 9 does not require secularization; the government can
legitimately reflect the traditional religious views of its majority without
violating the ECHR.312 Extrapolating from the Lautsi ruling, Spain can teach
Catholicism in public schools without violating the principle of state neutrality
as long as it does not attempt to coerce or indoctrinate its students.
D. Economic Support for the Catholic Church
Fourth, the State agreed to provide economic support to the Catholic
Church.313 The concordat provided that the church is not subject to income
taxes or sales taxes,314 it is exempt from property taxes,315 and it enjoys the
same economic rights as non-religious charities.316 Additionally, Spaniards
may assign a portion of their income tax payment to the Catholic Church.317
309 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040#{“itemid”:[“001-104040”]}.
310 Id. paras. 71–74; see also Witte & Arold, supra note 15, at 52.
311 Lautsi, App. No. 30814/06, para. 36.
312 Witte & Arold, supra note 15, at 52.
313 Specifically, the concordat requires the state to “collaborate with the Catholic Church to ensure its
maintenance.” Acuerdo entre el estado español y la santa sede sobre asuntos económicos art. 2.1 (B.O.E. 1979,
29490) (Spain) [hereinafter 1979 Concordat III] (“El Estado se compromete a colaborar con la Iglesia Católica
en la consecución de su adecuado sostenimiento económico, con respeto absoluto del principio de libertad
religiosa.”).
314 The church is not subject to income taxes or sales taxes with regard to published works, teaching in
seminaries or religious institutions, and the acquisition of objects to be used for worship. Id. art. 3.
315 It is exempt from property tax on buildings used for worship, for housing clergy, church administrative
offices, seminaries, convents, and monasteries. Id. art. 4.
316 The Church has the right to create institutions that benefit the public welfare, and these shall enjoy the
same rights and benefits of private, nonreligious charities. 1979 Concordat I, supra note 229, art. 5.1 (“Las
instituciones o entidades de carácter benéfico o asistencial de la Iglesia o dependientes de ella se regirán por
sus normas estatutarias y gozarán de los mismos derechos y beneficios que los entes clasificados como de
beneficencia privada.”).
317 1979 Concordat III, supra note 313, art. 2.2 (“[E]l Estado podrá asignar a la Iglesia católica un
porcentaje del rendimiento de la imposición sobre la renta o el patrimonio neto u otra de carácter
personal . . . .”). The assignment was meant to be a temporary source of economic aid; the Church promised to
be self-supporting within three years. Id. art. 2.5 (“La Iglesia Católica declara su propósito de lograr por sí
misma los recursos suficientes para la atención de sus necesidades.”); id. art. 2.4 (“[S]e llevará a cabo en el
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The assignment is completely voluntary, meaning taxpayers may choose to
assign a tax benefit to a different religious entity, or to not assign any portion
of their taxes.318 In 2010, income tax assignments amounted to twenty-five
percent of the Church’s operating budget.319
The concordat’s tax exemptions are constitutional because they are
consistent with the LOLR and with the constitutional principal of equality. The
agreements with Islam, Judaism, and the Protestant Federations contain the
same tax exemptions.320
The assignment of income tax revenue, however, is not consistent with the
constitutional principal of equality. The cooperation agreements with the
Protestant, Islamic, and Jewish Federations are not equal to the concordat with
the Catholic Church because these agreements do not create systems of
financing for the respective religions.321 Although taxpayers can chose to
assign the 0.7% of their income taxes to any other religious organization, any
charity, or to the state, in practice this provision channels more money to the
Church than to any other religion.322 In an effort to combat this inequality, the
state created the Foundation of Pluralism and Coexistence (“Foundation”) in
2005.323 The Foundation contributes money to the cultural and educational
programs run by the religions with deep roots in Spanish society.324 Although
the specific funds may not be used for worship-related activities, a religious
organization that receives Foundation funding will necessarily have more

plazo de tres años.”). However, the Church did not become financially independent, and the tax assignment
was extended. In 2007, Prime Minister Zapatero raised the tax assignment from 0.52% to 0.7% of each
taxpayer’s income taxes. Combalía & Roca, supra note 1, at 638.
318 1979 Concordat III, supra note 313, art. 2.2 (“Para ello será preciso que cada contribuyente manifesté
expresamente en la declaración respectiva su voluntad acerca del destino de la parte afectada.”); see also
Carmen Garcimartín Montero, Direct Financing of the Religious Denominations in Spain: Changes Introduced
by the 2005 General State Budget Law, 48 J. CHURCH & ST. 175, 185 (2006).
319 Combalía & Roca, supra note 1, at 638.
320 See, e.g., FEREDE Agreement, supra note 190, art. 11.
321 See Garcimartín Montero, supra note 318, at 189–90. The Jewish Federation rejected a system of tax
assignments at the outset of negotiations. Id. The Protestant Federation could not come to an internal
agreement on the best way to secure state financing and therefore abandoned the idea. Id. The state rejected the
Islamic Federation’s proposed system of budgetary funding because it was not proportional to the Catholic
Church’s system of tax assignments. Id.
322 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 803; see, e.g., Francisco Delgado, Datos Aproximados Sobre la
Financiación de la Iglesia Católica en España y sus Orígenes, EL OBSERVATORIO DE LA LAICIDAD (Apr. 1,
2010), http://www.laicismo.org/detalle.php?tg=41&pg=1&pk=18319.
323 Orden ECI/925/2005 (B.O.E. 2005, 12743).
324 Id.
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money for its worship activities. Money it previously allocated to cultural and
educational activities can now be redistributed to worship activities.325
However, the creation of the Foundation does not change the fact that the
assignment of income tax revenue gives preferential treatment to the Catholic
Church.326 This is because the state unilaterally determines how the
Foundation’s funds will be distributed, whereas the tax assignment system
allows the Catholic Church to determine how that revenue will be used.327 This
is fundamentally unequal treatment and seems to hinder, rather than promote,
state cooperation with religions.328 Furthermore, while the Foundation allows
for state funds to be distributed to deeply-rooted religions, there is no similar
organization to distribute state funds to the many religions that do not have
deep roots in Spanish society.
Although the state does not provide equal financing for all religions, this
fact does not make the Concordat unconstitutional. Article 16.3 specifically
requires the state to maintain cooperative relations with the Catholic Church,
and one manifestation of this cooperation was a system of tax assignments for
the Church. The fact that the state has not created a similar system of
assignments for other religions, or created a different form of direct financing,
does not make the Concordat unconstitutional. Instead, it calls into question the
sufficiency of the state’s cooperation with other religions.
The 1979 Concordat is consistent with the Constitution’s grant of religious
freedom. It does not violate the principles of neutrality and equality because
the rights it affords to the Catholic Church are parallel with the rights afforded
to other religions, both deeply rooted and emerging. The 1979 Concordat is
therefore a legitimate use of the doctrine of state cooperation.
III. THE 1979 CONCORDAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ECHR’S PROVISIONS FOR
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The previous Part argued that the 1979 Concordat is consistent with
Articles 16.1, 16.3, and 9.2 of the Spanish Constitution. However, to be
constitutional, the Concordat must also comply with Article 10.2 of the
Spanish Constitution. Recall that Article 10.2 requires all fundamental rights

325
326
327
328

Garcimartín Montero, supra note 318, at 195.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 195.
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be interpreted in accordance with the international treaties ratified by Spain
before 1978.329 Because the Concordat of 1979 is part and parcel of the
Constitution’s grant of fundamental rights to the Catholic Church, it must
comport with the treaties ratified before 1978. Spain ratified the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in
1977.330 Therefore, the Concordat must comply with the protections embodied
in the ECHR.
The ECHR requires member states to both actively secure the rights and
freedoms set forth in the Convention and to refrain from interfering with those
rights.331 Additionally, the Convention established the European Court of
Human Rights to enforce the principles it set forth.332 The ECHR protects
religious liberty in Article 9, which splits freedom of religion into two
categories: freedom of religious belief and free expression of religious
belief.333 This Part will discuss three things: (A) the ECHR’s grant of freedom
of religious belief; (B) the ECHR’s grant of freedom of expression of religious
belief; and (C) the European Court of Human Rights’ case law interpreting the
ECHR’s Article 9 grants.
A. Freedom of Religious Belief
The ECHR protects freedom of religious belief in Article 9, stating that
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief . . .”334 The Convention
assumed that all religions are equal in the sense that none contains the absolute
truth.335 If Catholicism is as valid as Islam, which is as valid as Scientology,
then each person should have the right to choose the religion he prefers.336 All
religions are equally protectable, according to the Convention, “not because
they provide ‘reasonable’ or ‘true’ answers to vital questions, but because they
329

C.E. art 10.2, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
The European Human Rights System, HREA, http://www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=365 (last visited
Mar. 4, 2013).
331 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 73, art. 1.
332 Id. art. 19.
333 For a detailed discussion of the religious liberty protections in international law, including the drafting
history and application of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, see MALCOLM D. EVANS,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE (1997).
334 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 73, art. 9.
335 Javier Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion in the Case Law of the
European Court of Human Rights, in STATE-CHURCH RELATIONS IN EUROPE: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND
TRENDS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY 61, 71 (Lucia Grešková ed., 2008).
336 Id.
330
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are the result of the person’s legitimate choice.”337 Non-belief is likewise
protected.338
The ECHR does not limit freedom of belief, but the European Court of
Human Rights has narrowly construed the beliefs that qualify for protection.339
To qualify as a “religious belief,” a belief must relate to a substantial aspect of
human life and behavior, must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness,
cohesion, and importance, and must be compatible with respect for human
dignity.340 Similarly, not every act that is motivated by a qualifying belief is
covered by Article 9. The court draws a distinction between an activity central
to the expression of religion and one that is merely inspired or encouraged by
it.341
B. Free Expression of Religious Belief
The ECHR protects expression of religious belief in Article 9, stating that
“[e]veryone has the right to . . . freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.”342 The ECHR protects both public and
private religious expression, such as proselytism, ritual animal slaughters, free
access to places of worship, and the ability to take part in religious
observances.343
The Convention permits interference with freedom of religious expression
in the broad circumstances “prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,

337

Id. at 72.
MURDOCH, supra note 165, at 12.
339 Id. at 11.
340 Id. For example, beliefs in assisted suicide, or language preferences, or disposal of human remains
after death do not qualify. Id. Religious belief is not synonymous with the words “opinions” or “ideas.”
EVANS, supra note 333, at 290 (citing Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1982)). In this respect, the scope of Article 9 is broader than the scope of Article 10, which protects freedom
of association. Id.
341 MURDOCH, supra note 165, at 15. For example, distribution of information persuading women not to
undergo abortions is not included in the scope of Article 9. Id. at 16; see, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 7050/75, 19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5, 19–20 (1978) (pacifist’s dissemination of leaflets
that express critical observations of the government rather than pacifist values do not qualify as a
manifestation of belief).
342 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 73, art. 9.
343 MURDOCH, supra note 165, at 15–16.
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health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”344
The limitation balances individual rights against competing considerations. A
state may therefore curtail religious expression if it can prove that a qualifying
consideration outweighs individual rights. Implicit in this balancing test is the
requirement that the interference has a legitimate aim.345 In practice, a state can
easily prove a legitimate aim for the interference.346 Proving the interference is
necessary in a democratic society is more difficult, and requires the action be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and justified by relevant and
sufficient reasons.347
C. European Court of Human Rights and the 1979 Concordat
The European Court of Human Rights helps define the scope and content of
the substantive rights granted by the ECHR.348 Therefore, the Spanish
Constitutional Court has held that Spain’s grant of rights should be congruous
with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.349 The European
Court of Human Rights has decided numerous cases regarding Article 9.350
Important for the purposes of this Comment are those Article 9 cases that touch
on rights given to the Catholic Church in the 1979 Concordat. By way of
reminder, those rights are: (1) state recognition of Catholic rites, such as
344 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 73, art. 9. This replicates the formula used for
balancing individual rights against relevant competing considerations found elsewhere in the convention.
Murdoch, supra note 164, at 10.
345 MURDOCH, supra note 165, at 10.
346 Id. at 26.
347 Id. at 30. Determining whether a measure is necessary and proportionate is not a mechanical exercise,
but some generalizations can be made. The stronger the social necessity, the less difficult it will be to justify
the interference. For instance, national security and public safety are compelling social needs. Id at 31.
348 Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet, Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, in A
EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 677, 698 (Helen Keller & Alec
Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
349 S.T.C., Mar. 14, 1984, No. 36, in B.O.E. n. 80 (supp.), Apr. 3, 1984, p. 21, at 22 (Spain) (“[A]rtículo
10.2 . . . autoriza y aun a conseja, referirse, para la búsqueda de estos criterios, a la doctrina sentada por el
Tribunal Europeo de los Derechos Humanos . . . .”); see also S.T.C., Sept. 27, 1999, No. 162, in B.O.E. n. 263
(supp.), Nov. 3, 1999, p. 9, FJ 5, at 19 (Spain) (“El [Tribunal Europeo de los Derechos Humanos] constituye
un obligado y valioso medio hermenéutico para configurar el contenido y alcance de los derechos
fundamentales.”); Keller & Sweet, supra note 348, at 698.
350 E.g., Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040 (the right to display religious symbols in public); Schüth v.
Germany, App. No. 1620/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-100469 (employment by a religious institution); Grzelak v. Poland, App. No.
7710/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 15, 2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-99384 (religious education in public schools); Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 2001-XII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 81, 107–19 (state recognition of religious communities).
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marriage, holy days, and attending mass; (2) foreign sovereignty of the
Church, including state recognition of the Church leaders; (3) Catholic
religious education in public schools; and (4) economic support for the
Catholic Church, including a voluntary assignment of income tax revenue.
First, Article 9’s grant of freedom of conscience extends to individuals in
state custody. The Court held that prison inmates must be allowed to take part
in religious worship.351 However, other religious considerations, such as the
wearing of religious clothing, talismans, or beards, has been carefully
constrained according to the need for order and security.352 The 1979
Concordat requires the state provide mass for prison inmates as a way to
ensure that all people can fully and effectively practice the Catholic religion.
The Concordat does not, however, grant other forms of religious manifestation
to inmates. In the same way as the European Court of Human Rights, the
Concordat recognizes the demands of order and security in prisons.
Second, Article 9 provides a measure of sovereignty to religious
organizations. In Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, the Bulgarian government
replaced the national leader of the Bulgarian Muslim community against the
will of the community.353 The Court held that the state cannot interfere with
the internal affairs of a religious community.354 This is similar to the
Concordat’s grant of sovereignty to the Catholic Church in Spain. The
Concordat provides that the state may not interfere with the Church’s creation
of diocese and other congregations, its appointment of priests and Church
hierarchy, or its land, buildings, and archives.
Third, Article 9 of the ECHR allows teaching of the faith as a manifestation
of belief. In Kokkinakis v. Greece, the Court explained that an individual’s
right to change his religion necessarily includes the freedom of others to try to
convince him to adopt their religion.355 However, the state may restrict
proselytism when it amounts to coercion, since coercion is not compatible with
respect for the freedom of conscience of others.356 In Spain, the Catholic
351

Case of X v. U.K., App. No. 5947/72, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 8 (1976).
See X v. Austria, App. No. 1753/63, 8 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 20 (1965) (the need to be able
to identify prisoners warranted the refusal to allow a prisoner to grow a beard).
353 Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1339 (2000).
354 Id.
355 Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 418 (1993) (“While religious
freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom to ‘manifest [one’s]
religion.’ Bearing witness in words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious convictions.”).
356 Id. para. 48. The Court defined improper proselytism as “offering material or social advantages with a
view to gaining new members for a Church or exerting improper pressure on people in distress or in need; it
352
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Church’s right to teach religious education in public schools is not proselytism
and does not amount to coercion. Every public school is required to offer
Catholic religious education classes, but students are not required to enroll.
Fourth, the case law of the European Court addresses a state’s economic
support of religious organizations. In Bruno v. Sweden, the Court held that a
state may permissibly raise funds for a religious organization through tax
revenue as long as non-believers could opt out of the tax.357 A state may not
require non-believers to support a religious organization; this is a corollary of
Article 9’s freedom of conscience protection.358 The 1979 Concordat creates a
voluntary church tax. Non-Catholics may assign the tax revenue to another
religious organization or to the government. Therefore, the Concordat complies
with the rule of Bruno v. Sweden.
The preceding cases can be distilled to one central principle of the
European Court’s Article 9 case law: state preference for one religion over
another does not necessarily violate the ECHR, provided that inequalities in
the treatment of religions have an “objective and reasonable justification.”
State actions that do not infringe on the right of citizens to worship freely are
legitimate, even if they are not completely neutral. More important than
separation of church and state, in the view of the European Court of Human
Rights, is that the state provide religious freedom for all. For this reason,
several European nations have de facto or de jure establishments of one faith
along with robust religious freedom for others.359 The Spanish model of
church-state relations therefore accords with the ECHR.
CONCLUSION
The Spanish model of religious freedom demonstrates that true and
complete religious liberty can exist without strict separation of church and
state. The Constitution of 1978 allows the Spanish government to form

may even entail the use of violence or brainwashing; more generally, it is not compatible with respect for the
freedom of thought, conscience and religion of others.” Id.
357 Bruno v. Sweden, App. No. 32196/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Aug. 28, 2001), available at http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-5998. Sweden allowed non-believers to be exempt from the portion
of a tax that paid for religious activities. Id.
358 MURDOCH, supra note 165, at 34–36.
359 Of the forty-seven current member states of the ECHR, only twelve have officially established
religions. These twelve countries are: Denmark, Liechtenstein, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Iceland, Malta,
Monaco, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the
Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 405 (2008).
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cooperative relationships with religious organizations, while still upholding the
principles of state neutrality and equality.
If we desire complete liberty of the church, it is not possible to have
absolute separation of church and state. That could not work unless worship
was carried on without any public manifestations, in only the inner temple of
the soul. But one of the main functions of organized religion is to bring its
adherents together for the outward expression of their faith. Therefore, the
government must provide not only the liberty to form communities for
worship, but must also provide the means to enjoy it. The Spanish Constitution
not only protects freedom of conscience by prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of religion, it protects freedom of conscience by requiring the state to
facilitate the participation of all citizens in religious life. In this way, Spain has
created a real and effective liberty.360
The most important way Spain has provided for real and effective liberty of
conscience is through cooperation agreements with the religious organizations
that are deeply rooted in Spanish society. The 1979 Concordat with the
Catholic Church was the first cooperation agreement created under the new
constitution. It presented the church and state as partners in the development of
Spanish society.361 The 1979 Concordat provided state recognition of Catholic
rites, foreign sovereignty of the Catholic Church, Catholic religious education
in public schools, and economic support for the church. The Concordat became
a model for later cooperation agreements with the Protestant Federation, the
Islamic Federation, and the Jewish Federation. In those agreements, the state
conferred to the religious organizations many of the rights originally given to
the Catholic Church. For that reason, the cooperation of the state with religions
has been beneficial for the development of the three minority religions that are
deeply rooted in Spanish society.362
The ultimate aim of the 1979 Concordat is to realize freedom of religion to
the full extent allowed by the Constitution. The cooperative regime it creates is
beneficial for both the Church and the state. For the church, the Constitution
allows believers to live according to their religion and the norms of
ecclesiastical law and allows church authorities to exercise their functions
360

As Jules Simon said, “[A] shabby ceremonial and a needy clergy are at once a scandal and a public
peril. It is a fault, both in policy and logic, to tolerate religion in a state and to condemn it to misery and
shame.” De Bourge, supra note 11, at 555 (quoting JULES SIMON, LA LIBERTÉ DE CONSCIENCE (1857)).
361 Peter Petkoff, Legal Perspectives and Religious Perspectives of Religious Rights Under International
Law in the Vatican Concordats (1963–2004), 158 LAW & JUST.: CHRISTIAN L. REV. 30, 42 (2007).
362 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 796.
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without fear of persecution. For the state, the Constitution requires the laws
and administration to respect and enforce the general principal of religious
freedom.363
State-church cooperation is a familiar concept to Catholic thinkers. In the
fifth century, St. Augustine urged all men to dedicate themselves to the eternal
truths of the Christian faith.364 In 1864, Pope Pius IX said the state should be
governed according to Catholic teachings.365 The Second Vatican Council
claimed that the subject and the goal of all social institutions must be the
human person, because humanity’s progress and the advancement of society
itself hinge on one another.366 In the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World, Pope Paul VI said, “We are tempted to think that our personal
rights are fully ensured only when we are exempt from every requirement of
divine law, but this way lies not the maintenance of the dignity of the human
person, but its annihilation.”367
Because the state seeks the betterment of its people, it should encourage
participation in social institutions, including religious institutions. The state
must not interfere with the goals of the spiritual community,368 but must
engage in a dialogue with it. Spanish law understands that religion is not just a
concern for the individual conscience. Religion is innately about community
and society, therefore the state must be interested in it.369
The concept of church and state cooperation is not foreign to secular
philosophers, either. According to one famous neo-Marxist, Jürgen Habermas,
the state depends on a political integration of citizens that must be more than
an accommodation of religion by secular society, but must connect the societal
morality to the legal order “in such a way that one consistently proceeds from
the other.”370

363

Plöchl, supra note 224, at 16–17.
See SAINT AUGUSTINE, supra note 18, at 322–23.
365 See Pope Pius IX, supra note 22, at 382.
366 PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD – GAUDIUM ET SPES, para. 25
(1965), translation available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/
vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html (promulgated by Pope Paul VI).
367 Id. para. 41.
368 AVERY DULLES, A CHURCH TO BELIEVE IN: DISCIPLESHIP IN THE DYNAMICS OF FREEDOM 164 (1982).
369 Petkoff, supra note 361, at 33–34.
370 Jürgen Habermas, Pre-Political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional State?, in THE
DIALECTICS OF SECULARIZATION: ON REASON AND RELIGION 21, 49 (Brian McNeil trans., Florian Schuller ed.,
2006).
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It is important to remember that both the state and the church are devoted to
the welfare of mankind.371 Although the church and the political community in
their own fields are autonomous and independent,372 their service will be more
effective if they work together.373 By creating a society that does not merely
tolerate religious belief, but promotes its growth, Spain can better advance the
common good. Religion teaches morality and respect for the inherent dignity
of mankind.374
This Comment does not suggest that state cooperation with religion is
always a good thing. In fact, two defective methods of state cooperation
readily come to mind. First, if the church governs the state, it can ignore the
consciences of non-believers. Second, if the state governs the church, it can
ignore the rights of believers. However, Spain was able to forge a cooperative
regime that affirms the rights of the majority Catholic society without
trampling on the rights of the minority. The government’s grant of specific
rights and privileges to religious groups promotes religious freedom for
believers and non-believers. For believers, the rights ensure that they can take
part in a living and mature faith that encompasses every sphere375: religious
education, civil recognition of sacraments and holy days, and non-taxation of
tithes are all an attempt to ensure that the Catholic Church is present in Spain
for those who want it. The rights also protect non-believers, who cannot be
coerced into belief. In practice, Spain’s protection of religious freedom is not
perfect. The fact that emerging religions cannot negotiate bilateral agreements
with the state might be an impermissible form of discrimination that calls into
question the state’s neutrality.376 But the beauty of the Spanish system is that it
allows the state to address this discrimination and to fix it by engaging directly
with the affected religions. Through cooperation, Spain can continue to work
toward full religious freedom for all people.
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Pope Paul VI, supra note 366, para. 74.
Id. para. 76.
373 Id.
374 Religion teaches that “everyone must consider his neighbor without exception as another self . . . .” Id.
para. 27.
375 Id. paras. 17–21.
376 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 1, at 807–08.
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